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Beyond “Best Practices”: Employment-Discrimination Law 
in the Neoliberal Era 
DEBORAH DINNER* 
Why does U.S. legal culture tolerate unprecedented economic inequality even as it 
valorizes social equality along identity lines? This Article takes a significant step 
toward answering this question by examining the relationship between U.S. 
employment-discrimination law and neoliberalism. It shows that the rise of anti-
discrimination ideals in the late twentieth century was intertwined with the de-
regulation of labor and with cutbacks in the welfare state. The Article argues that 
even “best practices” to prevent employment discrimination are insufficient to real-
ize a labor market responsive to the needs of low-income workers for adequate 
wages, safe work conditions, and work hours and schedules that allow for fulfilling 
family and civic lives.  
The legal scholarship on employment discrimination and the humanities scholar-
ship on neoliberalism are ordinarily siloed. Placing these two literatures in conver-
sation shows that the ideals underpinning Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
overlap with the major tenets of neoliberalism. Both affirm individual freedom, effi-
cient markets, and judicially enforced negative rights. 
The conceptual convergence between Title VII and neoliberalism enabled em-
ployers, business trade associations, courts, and even liberal scholars to interpret 
the statute in ways that expanded managerial freedom and undermined workers’ 
economic security and control over the terms of their jobs. Drawing on novel histori-
cal research, this Article illustrates how this happened. In the early 1970s, employers 
litigated under Title VII to invalidate state laws regulating the hours and conditions 
of women’s work. Today, legal scholars commonly extol the end of these labor stand-
ards as marking the genesis of a contemporary prohibition on sex-role stereotypes. 
In actuality, the erosion of state protective labor laws represented the defeat of 
working-class feminists’ more capacious vision for sex equality. Through the 1970s 
and 1980s, furthermore, scholars argued that Title VII promoted efficient labor mar-
kets. This normative justification, however, had the unintended effect of foreclosing 
claims under the statute that sought not merely opportunity but also the transfor-
mation of labor-market structures.  
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Failure to understand how neoliberalism and Title VII jurisprudence intersected 
historically leaves us blind to the ways in which employment-discrimination law may 
legitimate economic inequality. This has important consequences for contemporary 
legal theory. Dominant antidiscrimination theories—centered on antistereotyping 
and efficiency—reinforce the existing terms of the employment relationship and do 
not serve the needs of working-class women and men. This Article reveals the limits 
of antidiscrimination theory to remediate class-based subordination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This Article brings new insight to bear on a puzzle in American legal and political 
culture: why has economic inequality grown, even as the nation has taken significant 
strides toward social equality? In the late twentieth century, the antidiscrimination 
ideal gained legitimacy at the same time that economic inequality rose to an apex 
unmatched in American history. Both the political Left and Right subscribe to ideals 
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of formal equality, meritocracy, and individual freedom. Most Americans abhor dis-
crimination on the basis of race and sex, at least in the abstract.1 Yet the United States 
has among the largest disparities in income and wealth of all developed countries.2 
Sociologists and political theorists link these disparities to the ascendance of 
neoliberal policies, including the deregulation of capital and labor markets and a re-
trenchment in the welfare state.3 In sum, while our legal and political culture aspires 
to end discrimination on the basis of identity categories, we also tolerate deepening 
subordination on the basis of class. This Article analyzes a more specific formulation 
of the larger puzzle: what is the socio-legal function of employment discrimination 
law in the neoliberal age? 
To answer this question, we must begin by exploring a corresponding scholarly 
dilemma. Voluminous bodies of scholarship examine antidiscrimination law, on one 
hand, and neoliberalism, on the other. Antidiscrimination scholarship celebrates Title 
VII for containing the promise of sex and race equality, even if the statute has not 
yet fully realized that aspiration. Title VII, the scholarship argues, has the capacity 
to help dismantle a socio-legal system that enforces ideas about race and sex differ-
ence. Scholarship in the humanities, meanwhile, decries neoliberalism as the con-
stellation of ideologies, laws, and policies that has entrenched economic inequality. 
Neoliberalism, this literature argues, has functioned as a “mode[] of governance”4 to 
deregulate capital and labor markets, privatize former state functions, and cut welfare 
entitlements. These two literatures on antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. Even formal equality for gays, lesbians, and transgender individuals, however, re-
mains politically contested. See, e.g., Jonathan Capehart, Don’t Expect Gay Rights To Stay 
Under GOP’s Radar for Long, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/opinions/dont-expect-gay-rights-to-stay-under-the-gops-radar-for-long/2016/01/08/0a95e8a0-b576 
-11e5-9388-466021d971de_story.html [https://perma.cc/YS9D-P7AH] (describing pressures 
within the GOP for presidential candidates to vocalize support for religious liberty over gay 
rights); Chris Johnson, DNC Chair Expects 2016 Platform To Include Equality Act, WASH. 
BLADE (Sept. 28, 2015, 2:02 PM), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/09/28/dnc-chair 
-expects-2016-platform-to-include-equality-act/ [https://perma.cc/8V5M-8W8E] (describing 
probable Democratic Party support for adding sexual orientation to the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 and Fair Housing Act). Likewise, the Right has not always supported formal equality. 
Instead, over the course of several decades’ conflict and accommodation, conservatives came 
to embrace equality while also contributing to a narrowing of its meaning. The defeat of the 
Equal Rights Amendment, coupled with the achievement of formal equality under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, provides a case in point. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional 
Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto 
ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323 (2006) (examining how social-movement mobilization and 
countermobilization shaped the meaning of constitutional sex equality).  
 2. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., CRISIS SQUEEZES INCOME AND PUTS 
PRESSURE ON INEQUALITY AND POVERTY 4 fig.4 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/els/soc 
/OECD2013-Inequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf [https://perma.cc/FK84-9QCG] (showing that the 
United States has the fourth highest level of income inequality among thirty-four Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) nations). 
 3. See, e.g., WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH 
REVOLUTION 28 (2015); DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 7–13 (2005). 
 4. Corinne Blalock, Neoliberalism and the Crisis of Legal Theory, 77 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 71, 83 (2014). 
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however, are siloed from each other.5 The failure to put them in conversation hinders 
scholars’ capacity to analyze the historical relationship between sex-discrimination 
law and neoliberalism and as well as the normative consequences of this relationship 
for gender and class inequities today. This Article is among the first to recognize that 
antidiscrimination may function as a “master legal frame”6 to legitimate neoliberalism. 
The Article analyzes how employment-discrimination law advanced neo-
liberalism in the late twentieth century and explains why this history matters.7 It uses 
historical examples to illuminate unexamined shortcomings in contemporary legal 
scholarship and doctrine.8 The Article begins in Part I by reviewing dual scholarly 
narratives: Title VII’s importance to sex equality and neoliberalism’s impact on class 
inequities. Analyzing these narratives side-by-side offers new insight into the values 
that underpin both Title VII and neoliberalism. These values include the ideal of 
efficient markets, the notion that the fundamental subject of law is the individual 
rather than the collective, and the primacy of negative rights enforced by the judici-
ary. The Article thus points to conceptual overlap between employment discrimina-
tion law and neoliberalism. 
Part II considers how the historical implementation of Title VII via legal institu-
tions, doctrine, and thought helped to catalyze and entrench a neoliberal labor mar-
ket. To examine this dynamic, the Article focuses on legal contests in the late twen-
tieth century about the meaning of sex equality in employment. I make two historical 
claims. The first argument is that Title VII came to eclipse labor protection as the 
leading framework for understanding legal sex equality. I argue, more provocatively, 
that the rise of the antidiscrimination ideal and the decline of the protective ideal 
were not merely coincidental; rather, the deployment of Title VII played a causal role 
                                                                                                                 
 
 5. Recent scholarship has begun to examine the neoliberal dimensions of multiple legal 
fields. See, e.g., Anne L. Alstott, Neoliberalism in U.S. Family Law: Negative Liberty and 
Laissez-Faire Markets in the Minimal State, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 25 (2014); Amy 
Kapczynski, Intellectual Property’s Leviathan, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131 (2014). To date, 
however, no one has followed this line of inquiry into employment law. 
 6. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes 
and the Transformation of the Women’s Movement in the 1960s, 111 AM. J. SOC. 1718, 1727 
(2006) (arguing that in the late 1960s the women’s movement shifted its legal framing from 
protection to equality). 
 7. This Article is among the first to critique the neoliberal dimensions of antidiscrimina-
tion doctrine and theory. I draw on earlier work highlighting the failure of antidiscrimination 
law to challenge structural inequality and exploitation within the employment relationship. 
See Tucker Culbertson & Jack Jackson, Proper Objects, Different Subjects and Juridical 
Horizons in Radical Legal Critique, in FEMINIST AND QUEER LEGAL THEORY 135, 145–51 
(Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. Jackson & Adam P. Romero eds., 2009) (critiquing the-
ories of sexual harassment advanced by Janet Halley and Vicki Schultz that fail to challenge 
the exploitation of workers within neoliberal capitalism); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond 
Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1736 (2012) (arguing that antidiscrimination laws based on identity are inadequate to remedi-
ate structural disadvantage that arises from social roles and functions). 
 8. The purpose of this Article is not to examine comprehensively the historical process 
by which feminism and neoliberalism intertwined. I analyze these dynamics in broader scope 
and greater detail elsewhere. See DEBORAH DINNER, CONTESTED LABOR: SOCIAL REPRO-
DUCTION, WORK, AND LAW IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE, 1965–2010 (forthcoming 2018). 
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in the decline of labor protection. Second, I argue that while inherently limited in its 
capacity to promote economic equality along class lines, Title VII once held more 
capacious meaning. Trends in scholarship and in doctrine through the 1970s, how-
ever, interpreted Title VII according to neoliberal principles and thereby narrowed 
its scope. I conclude that neoliberalism left its imprint on Title VII both in the design 
and the implementation of the statute.  
Rather than providing a comprehensive historical narrative, I analyze two illus-
trative moments that were pivotal to constructing the meaning of sex equality. The 
first was the end of maternalist labor laws in the early 1970s. I challenge the schol-
arship that celebrates these laws’ demise as the genesis of contemporary sex equality 
doctrine. Instead, I highlight labor feminists’ understanding that sex equality required 
state action to mitigate capitalism’s excesses. These feminists, who used unions to 
fight for women’s rights, argued for protective labor standards as well as equal em-
ployment opportunity.9 As the concept of antistereotyping came to replace that of 
labor protection, this ideal got lost. As a result, antidiscrimination law protected 
women’s rights to equal employment opportunity in a labor market characterized by 
the absence of protective regulation. 
The second turning point was the framing of Title VII as an efficiency-promoting 
statute. This impulse manifested in the scholarship on race discrimination, which 
sought to ground the normative justification for Title VII in part on market values. 
But doing so made disparate-impact liability appear increasingly problematic and 
thereby foreclosed gender-discrimination claims that sought not merely to increase 
opportunity but rather to transform labor-market structures.  
In Part III, the Article analyzes the consequences of this history for contemporary 
understandings of equality. Today, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) and scholars advocate institutional “best practices” to prevent discrimina-
tion. Such best practices involve prohibitions on gender and racial stereotypes and 
reinforce the idea that employment-discrimination law promotes efficient labor mar-
kets. I argue, however, that these best practices are incapable of redressing the struc-
tural inequalities facing low-income workers. The dominance of antistereotyping 
theory relinquishes challenges to the fundamental terms of the employment relation-
ship and gives up claims that the state has a responsibility to regulate those terms. In 
addition, efficiency continues to act as a prominent rationale cabining the scope of 
employment-discrimination law. As a consequence, antidiscrimination doctrine and 
theory limit the kinds of disparate-impact litigation that would not only promote gen-
der inclusion within the workplace but also redistribute power between employers 
and workers. I show that the failure to recognize the imbrication of employment dis-
crimination law with neoliberalism obscures the interests of working-class women 
in debate about work-family conflict and legitimates class inequalities. 
By opening a new window into the history of sex-discrimination law, this Article 
raises a host of important questions about the limitations of contemporary anti-
discrimination theory. It is a common observation that current legal doctrines and 
institutions have not realized full inclusion and equal opportunity for women and 
racial and sexual minorities. Antidiscrimination law’s limits, however, run deeper. 
Employers, business trade associations, courts, and scholars have in specific 
                                                                                                                 
 
 9. DOROTHY SUE COBBLE, THE OTHER WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 4 (2004).  
1064 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1059 
 
instances deployed Title VII in ways that legitimated the status quo distribution of 
power between workers and employers as well as a minimal welfare state. I conclude 
by calling for greater attention to class as well as to sex to promote a labor market 
that offers adequate income as well as benefits and schedules that enable low-income 
workers to realize economic security, to gain greater control over the terms of their 
jobs, and to maintain fulfilling lives outside of work.  
I. THE PUZZLE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW IN THE NEOLIBERAL AGE 
To understand Title VII and neoliberalism as normatively related rather than op-
positional might be viewed as heretical. Almost without exception, the literature 
celebrates Title VII’s aspiration to disrupt gender and race hierarchies even as it 
recognizes the statute’s limitations in realizing this goal. Conversely, political 
theorists and historians lament that neoliberal governance has deepened economic 
inequality; legal scholars are beginning to join this chorus. Yet Title VII shares ideo-
logical underpinnings with the primary tenets of neoliberalism—an insight the 
scholarship has not yet recognized. 
A. Title VII: A Celebration 
The dominant narrative lauds Title VII for enabling the women’s movement’s 
efforts to combat employer practices and state laws that coerced the sexes into fixed 
gender roles. In campaigning for administrative rules that would “take seriously” the 
statute’s prohibition on sex discrimination, feminist activists challenged essentialist 
understandings of women’s nature, capacities, and interests. In litigating under Title 
VII, they combatted the gendered assumptions underpinning sex segregation in the 
labor market.10 
Antidiscrimination scholars argue that Title VII’s potential to topple gender hier-
archy lies in its prohibition on sex-role stereotyping.11 The antistereotyping principle 
takes aim at the family-wage system: the cultural ideologies, institutional practices, 
and laws that reinforced the model of a family comprised of a male breadwinner and 
dependent female caregivers.12 This principle suggests that laws and employer prac-
tices that reinforce the assumption that men are primarily workers and women are 
primarily caregivers violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title VII, respectively.13 Antistereotyping theory, therefore, offers 
the promise of ending state action and employer practices that coerce men and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 10. See Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 995, 
1012–13 (2015).  
 11. See infra notes 24042, 24856, and accompanying text.  
 12. See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY 7, 4244, 166 (2001). The family-
wage system was grounded in separate-spheres ideology, which emerged in the mid-
nineteenth century in response to the social disruption caused by industrialization. The idea 
that women would preserve domestic, nonmarket values and virtues in the home offered a 
salve against competitive capitalism. See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD, at xi, 
xiv–xxiii (2d ed. 1997) (describing the historiography on “separate spheres”). 
 13. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimina-
tion Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 83 (2010); Schultz, supra note 10, at 100001. 
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women into rigid gender roles. It bears the hope that people will more freely express 
identities in the workplace and realize a more humane balance between work and 
family. Both men and women should have greater choice and opportunity regarding 
whether and how to engage the rewards as well as the burdens of paid labor in the 
market and unpaid caregiving labor in the home. 
Antistereotyping theory affirms the individualism at the core of legal liberalism. 
The prohibition on unlawful stereotyping targets the gap between an individual’s true 
capacities and identity and the capacities attributed to her by a sex-respecting rule. 
The scholarship identifying the harms of stereotyping stresses this point. Anita 
Bernstein argues that “stereotyping is wrong to the extent that it functions to deprive 
individuals of their freedom without good cause.”14 Meredith Render explains that 
courts strike down certain gender stereotypes not because of the generalization itself, 
but rather because of a determination that the generalization is unfair.15 When law 
embodies gender stereotypes, it regulates behaviors in ways that make certain gender 
rules appear natural and fixed.16 This dynamic produces “social rules” that limit in-
dividual autonomy.17  
If sex segregation and the constraint on individual flourishing represents the clas-
sic injuries under Title VII, then “openness” emerges as a key trope in the scholarship 
valorizing the statute’s remedial hope. Legal scholar Vicki Schultz celebrates the 
transformation in the American workplace wrought by Title VII, with reference to 
her daughter’s “inherit[ance of] a world that is . . . more open”18 than that experienced 
by her mother or grandmother.19 Historian Nancy MacLean subtitles her important 
narrative about grassroots mobilization by women and people of color to enforce 
Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate, The Opening of the American Workplace.20 
The dominant narrative suggests that Title VII opens the labor market to women 
seeking economic opportunity and social freedom. 
Access to greater job opportunity in turn offers women enhanced material security 
and economic independence. Ending sex segregation enables working-class women 
to move from a pink-collar ghetto to better paid industrial jobs.21 It fosters profes-
sional women’s entrance into the ranks of higher management. As equal competitors 
in the labor market, women can assume the role of primary breadwinners rather than 
marginal workers. The enhanced economic autonomy makes them less dependent on 
                                                                                                                 
 
 14. Anita Bernstein, What’s Wrong with Stereotyping?, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 655, 659 (2013). 
Stereotypes, Bernstein explains, serve as a technology for spreading prejudice. Id. at 677. They 
enable the human brain to classify information about people and the world around them and 
then to index these classifications in the memory. This cognitive process in turn enables the 
brain to draw inferences about the stereotyped individual more quickly than one does ordinary 
negative generalizations. See id. at 677. 
 15. Meredith M. Render, Gender Rules, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 133, 162–63 (2010). 
 16. Id. at 163–69. 
 17. Id. at 169–72. 
 18. Schultz, supra note 10, at 1007. 
 19. Id. at 1006–07. 
 20. NANCY MACLEAN, FREEDOM IS NOT ENOUGH: THE OPENING OF THE AMERICAN 
WORKPLACE (2006). 
 21. See SHARON H. MASTRACCI, BREAKING OUT OF THE PINK-COLLAR GHETTO 66 (2004).  
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men and affords them greater freedom in choosing whether to enter or exit 
marriage.22  
The celebration of Title VII is not uniform and several critical voices explore the 
limitations of the statute in realizing sex equality. With few exceptions,23 however, 
the critical strain of scholarship on Title VII locates its limitations either in judicial 
interpretation24 or the statute’s implementation within workplaces.25 Scholars stop 
short of arguing robustly that Title VII itself may function within American legal 
culture to legitimate economic inequalities that disproportionately burden low-
income women workers. 
B. Neoliberalism: A Lament 
Neoliberalism is neither a coherent set of political policies nor a well-defined set 
of philosophical ideals.26 It is “not conceptually neat.”27 Rather, David Harvey, one 
of neoliberalism’s most prominent critics, argues that a fundamental premise organ-
izes this practice: “that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating indi-
vidual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework charac-
terized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade.”28 Social, 
political, and legal actors mobilize this premise “defensively” to preserve market re-
lations, “affirmatively” to support the rollout of market policies, and “ideologically” 
to legitimate legal systems.29  
The defining feature of neoliberalism is the hegemony of the free-market ideal, 
which constitutes the “common sense” of our era.30 The free-market ideal underpins 
deregulatory economic policies and also sets forth a theory of the societal good. 
Neoliberalism stands for the proposition that the aggregate (not the collective) wel-
fare is best realized through market transactions.31 Individual contracting in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 22. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 71 (1988). 
 23. See, e.g., Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1098–
99 (2009) (arguing that employment discrimination law has proven ineffectual in challenging 
the taken-for-granted workplace norms that produce gender inequality). 
 24. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 10, at 106668 (examining the “lack of interest” defense 
and pregnancy-discrimination cases and concluding that the courts failed to interpret Title VII 
broadly as a robust prohibition on sex stereotyping). 
 25. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Ap-
proach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 479–80 (2001) (arguing that courts are ill suited to address 
more subtle, nuanced, and contextually variable discriminatory practices, today, than the ex-
plicit sex and race-based bias and animus of the past). 
 26. Blalock, supra note 4, at 84. 
 27. David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 L. 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2014). 
 28. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 2. 
 29. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 5. 
 30. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 3. The definition of hegemony is that the perspectives and 
attitudes of the elite classes become the cultural consensus of the broader society. See gener-
ally 1 ANTONIO GRAMSCI, PRISON NOTEBOOKS (Joseph A. Buttigieg ed., Joseph A Buttigieg & 
Antonio Callari trans., Columbia University Press 1992) (1975) (describing the common as-
sumptions and beliefs that organize society). 
 31. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 3. 
2017] BEYOND “BEST PRACTICES”  1067 
 
market, moreover, is the site of individual expression and private choice.32 If one 
takes both these conclusions as true—that the market facilitates wealth maximization 
and personal freedom—then neoliberalism not only maximizes wealth but also 
promotes “the most decent society.”33 
Neoliberalism, as political theorist Wendy Brown demonstrates, remodels all 
spheres of society on the model of the market.34 Neoliberalism represents a “political 
rationality” that produces the “economization” of social life.35 The citizen is con-
ceived of as homo oeconomicus, an individual whose value to the polity is measured 
by the extent to which she or he can maximize his or her human capital.36 Neoliberal 
ideologies thereby transform citizens from democratic subjects and actors into indi-
vidual wealth maximizers.37  
Neoliberalism’s celebration of individual agency in the market relates closely to 
its second premise: the assault on collectivity and solidarity as democratic ideals. 
The ideal of the freely contracting consumer-citizen is in tension with social-justice 
projects, which require the subordination of individual interests in service of collec-
tive goods. Neoliberalism’s tendency is thus to sever social movements that celebrate 
individual difference and expression, in both labor and consumer markets, from mo-
bilization to realize nonmarket values. Accordingly, neoliberalism “split[s] off liber-
tarianism, identity politics, multiculturalism, and eventually narcissistic consumer-
ism” from social mobilization for labor power, state protection, and socioeconomic 
security.38 In particular, neoliberalism opposes the collective organization of workers 
through unions that hold the power to circumscribe freedom and flexibility of 
capital.39 
The third tenet of neoliberalism is the ideological commitment to a minimal state 
and to rollbacks in social services.40 Neoliberalism’s intellectual architect, Friedrich 
Hayek, believed that the market was so complex that it lay beyond the reach of hu-
man understanding.41 Accordingly, Hayek argued, government should not intervene 
in the market because politicians and administrators would be unable to predict the 
consequences of their interventions.42 David Grewal and Jedediah Purdy write that a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 32. Id. at 64. 
 33. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 6. 
 34. See BROWN, supra note 3, at 17. Harvey argues that neoliberalism represented an ide-
ology that big business imposed on the state to serve its own interests. HARVEY, supra note 3, 
at 13–15. Brown, however, contests this view. She argues that the free-market ideal is not 
merely a disguise for particular business interests. BROWN, supra note 3, at 64; see also Terry 
Flew, Michel Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics and Contemporary Neo-liberalism Debates, 
108 THESIS ELEVEN 44, 46–47 (2012) (observing that there are two dominant theoretical in-
terpretations of neoliberalism as a historical force in the second half of the twentieth century: 
a Marxist interpretation and an interpretation that synthesizes Marxism with Michel Foucault’s 
theory of governmentality).  
 35. BROWN, supra note 3, at 61–62. 
 36. Id. at 33–34. 
 37. Id. at 109. 
 38. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 41. 
 39. Id. at 75–76. 
 40. Id. at 76.  
 41. Blalock, supra note 4, at 85–86. 
 42. Blalock, supra note 4, at 86. 
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sense of pessimism regarding even the capacity for state action to discipline the mar-
ket pervades neoliberal political culture.43 Taken to its logical conclusion, the 
neoliberal state would have almost no responsibility toward the socioeconomic se-
curity of its citizenry, beyond what is necessary to enable market function and quell 
external political threats and internal social unrest that undermines market function.44  
In his famous 1978–1979 lectures at the College de France, Michel Foucault ob-
served that in the 1970s “the market . . . bec[a]me a new limit on the state even as it 
began to saturate and construe the state with its distinctive form of reason.”45 As 
political theorist Corinne Blalock argues, neoliberalism ideologically forecloses the 
very possibility of state economic regulation in service of the public good.46 The 
liberalism exemplified by the New Deal in the United States and social democracy 
in Europe sets constraints on the market, construing a primary function of govern-
ance to be mitigation of the harshest effects of capitalism. By contrast, neoliberalism 
envisions the purpose of the state as promoting economic growth by enabling free 
markets and competition.47 
The ideologies of the minimal welfare state and the free market transform the 
state’s response to inequality. These ideologies shift the basis of legitimacy for state 
action from democratic authority to an assessment of whether a proposed law would 
enable individual agency in the market.48 Furthermore, neoliberalism’s conceptual-
ization of the market undermines the demand for a state responsive to economic in-
equality. In contrast to classical economic liberalism, which focuses on mechanisms 
of exchange in the marketplace, neoliberalism focuses on market competition. As 
Wendy Brown explains, “equivalence is both the premise and the norm of exchange, 
while inequality is the premise and outcome of competition.”49 In constructing justice 
as the realization of each individual’s capacity to exercise free choice in the market, 
neoliberalism limits state responsibility for redressing economic inequality.50 As 
Grewal and Purdy caution, however, it would be too simplistic to label neoliberalism 
“antiregulatory.”51 The central inquiry should be which forms of regulation 
neoliberalism has enabled and which it has foreclosed, and in whose interests. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 43. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 6. 
 44. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 153 (“The only fear [the upper classes] have is of political 
movements that threaten them with expropriation or revolutionary violence. . . . [T]hey can 
hope that the sophisticated military apparatus they now possess . . . will protect their wealth 
and power . . . .”); see also id. at 15282. 
 45. BROWN, supra note 3, at 58. 
 46. See Blalock, supra note 4, at 8586. 
 47. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 6465; see Flew, supra note 34, at 5758. 
 48. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 3–4. 
 49. BROWN, supra note 3, at 64. 
 50. Blalock, supra note 4, at 93. 
 51. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 12–14. Contradictions exist between the ideal of a 
minimal state and the practice of neoliberalism. Harvey identifies several: that between the 
prohibition on state intervention in markets and active state policies that facilitate corporate 
power; that between individual freedom and the authoritarian discipline necessary to impose 
market discipline; and that between the aspiration toward the integrity of finance and the spec-
ulative activities of the financial sector. HARVEY, supra note 3, at 7980. Grewal and Purdy 
additionally highlight those contradictions elucidated by the German sociologist Wolfgang 
Streeck. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 2021. A tension exists in what Streeck calls 
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C. Putting Together the Puzzle Pieces 
The passage of Title VII did not presuppose neoliberalism; neoliberal policies 
were not a precondition for the emergence of employment discrimination law. The 
enactment of Title VII represented the fulfillment of multiple political movements 
and aspirations—most significantly, the movement for civil rights for African 
Americans.52 Nonetheless, the potential existed for Title VII to facilitate 
neoliberalism. Because Title VII and neoliberalism are both rooted in the American 
liberal tradition, they share common, animating values.53 These values include indi-
vidualism, efficiency, and negative rights.  
First, employment-discrimination law shares with neoliberalism an emphasis on 
individual self-determination and flourishing. Neoliberalism defines inequality as a 
problem of artificial constraints on individual agency.54 Employment-discrimination 
theory, and the antistereotyping principle in particular, similarly focus on injury to 
individual potential.55 This focus sidesteps questions of structural disadvantage. 
Neoliberal philosophies suggest that the purpose of government is to promote free-
dom of opportunity rather than to create more just economic structures. Employment-
discrimination law likewise promotes inclusion of those excluded from labor-market 
opportunity,56 but falls short of reconceptualizing the fundamental terms of the em-
ployment relationship. The metaphor of “opening” signals opportunity and access, 
but not transformation.  
Second, the hegemony of the market ideal is evident in both neoliberal ideology 
and scholarly and judicial interpretations of Title VII. Efficiency has emerged as a 
rationale both justifying and limiting interpretations of sex discrimination. Although 
                                                                                                                 
 
“democratic capitalism” between policies that encourage mass political participation and those 
that foster liberty of capital. Wolfgang Streeck, The Crises of Democratic Capitalism, 71 NEW 
LEFT REV. 5, 7–8 (2011). If a state capitulates too far in the direction of democratic claims for 
redistribution, it will upset economic elites; if it compensates the owners of capital in amounts 
that outrage the public, then it risks populist unrest. See id. 
 52. MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 51–75 (describing the social movement mobilization and 
counter-mobilization leading to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
 53. However, Wendy Brown argues that neoliberalism represents a fundamental depar-
ture from traditional liberalism. See WENDY BROWN, EDGEWORK 38–39, 44–46 (2005) (argu-
ing that the current erosion of democratic institutions signals a historical disjuncture). Despite 
the discontinuities of neoliberal political culture with the past, however, neoliberal ideals 
emerged from the wellspring of liberal thought.   
 54. See supra text accompanying notes 38–39.  
 55. See infra text accompanying notes 231–35, 238–52.  
 56. Certainly, Title VII promotes the inclusion of previously excluded groups (e.g., racial 
minorities and women) and not individuals universally. But the disparate-treatment theory of 
liability, at the core of the statute, operationalizes this inclusion largely via an analysis of dis-
crimination against individuals. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802–04 (1973) (setting forth a burden-shifting framework by which a plaintiff may prove an 
individual case of disparate-treatment liability), with Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 
431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977) (discussing the government’s burden in proving a “pattern or prac-
tice” under section 707(a) of Title VII). Moreover, the inclusion of those individuals within 
excluded groups who can meet the demands posed by existing labor-market structures falls far 
short of transforming those structures. 
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not all scholars argue that efficiency provides the normative underpinning for em-
ployment discrimination law, it is a predominant rationale within the case law.57 The 
judicial construction of Title VII as a statute meant to promote market rationality58 
helps to explain why courts routinely foreclose certain kinds of disparate-impact 
claims under Title VII.  
Third, Title VII doctrine, as it has evolved in the crucible of particular legal and 
political contexts, has functioned at specific moments to legitimate neoliberalism’s 
assault on the welfare state. Neoliberal ideology affirms the ideal of a minimal state, 
even as it aggrandizes some elements of the state while weakening others.59 The en-
actment of Title VII reinforced the courts’ role as engines of state building, but it has 
also undermined the ideal of positive entitlements to social welfare as guaranteed by 
legislatures and administrative agencies.60 
To say that neoliberalism and antidiscrimination law share values is not to argue 
that Title VII necessarily served neoliberal purposes. Such an argument would ignore 
historical contingency. The shared liberal values, however, did create the necessary 
condition for the historical possibility that Title VII would be construed and used in 
a manner that comported with neoliberal purposes. The overlap in the principles 
underpinning antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism enabled employers, courts, 
and scholars to frame Title VII to advance free-market ideologies, even though it did 
not predetermine that this would happen. Metaphorically speaking, the chemical 
compounds existed for a reaction to take place, but external events were necessary 
to catalyze the reaction. 
Understanding how Title VII and neoliberalism intertwined historically requires 
empirical analysis into the dynamic political and institutional contexts in which 
employment-discrimination law evolved. A host of questions require further investi-
gation: How did legal institutions facilitate or block the convergence between anti-
discrimination doctrine and neoliberal policies? In what ways did employers and 
business trade associations deploy Title VII? Did their actions facilitate or frustrate 
social movement mobilization to enforce Title VII? This Article initiates an inquiry 
into these questions and ultimately suggests that answering them should be critical 
to future research agendas in legal history, feminist theory, and employment law. 
II. NEOLIBERAL SEX EQUALITY: HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS 
The influential political theorist Nancy Fraser argues that feminism in the late 
twentieth century entered into a “romance” with neoliberalism.61 Feminists turned 
away from critiques of political economy and toward analyses of culture, she argues, 
at precisely the moment neoliberal theories of governance took hold.62 Fraser specu-
lates this could possibly be a tragic historical irony. Yet she queries whether “some 
                                                                                                                 
 
 57. See infra text accompanying notes 267–68.  
 58. See infra text accompanying notes 27374. 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 46–49. 
 60. See infra Part II.A.2.  
 61. Nancy Fraser, Feminism, Capitalism and the Cunning of History, 56 NEW LEFT REV. 
97, 99, 108–09 (2009). 
 62. Id. at 108–09. 
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perverse, subterranean elective affinity” existed between neoliberalism and femi-
nism.63 Feminists, for example, valorized workforce participation as a site of social 
equality. This ideal provided moral legitimacy for capitalist transformations that 
drew women into the labor market, made long hours pervasive, and reduced the real 
value of wages.64 Furthermore, feminists relinquished their earlier commitment to 
deconstructing ideological boundaries between production in the market and social 
reproduction, or the caregiving and other forms of labor needed to reproduce the next 
generation.65 Fraser’s claim is startling and provocative.66 Is it historically accurate?  
We do not yet have the historical knowledge that would enable us to understand 
fully the process by which feminist mobilization and antifeminist counter-
mobilization yielded neoliberal conceptions of sex equality. Part of the problem is 
that many historians portray feminist and antifeminist activism as limited to the “cul-
ture wars.”67 According to this historical narrative, feminists fought to destabilize 
conventional gender roles, while social conservatives fought to reinforce them. That 
is only half the story, however. Labor feminists and grassroots community activists 
fought not only for equal employment opportunity and sexual liberation but also for 
affirmative state regulation that would produce a more just employment relation-
ship.68 The most vocal and powerful opponents of this strain of feminist activism 
were not social conservatives but rather employers and business trade associations.69 
Legal scholarship is similarly limited by a focus on gender roles as opposed to 
broader capitalist structures. The legal literature depicts the battle over sex equality 
to have been fought on the terrain of sex-role stereotypes and antidiscrimination law 
rather than on that of economic justice and labor law. The legal scholarship empha-
sizes the development of an antistereostyping principle, which challenged state laws 
and employer practices that reinforced the male-breadwinner, female-caregiver 
dyad.70 Ruth Bader Ginsburg emerges as the primary heroine of this story, and her 
                                                                                                                 
 
 63. Id. at 108.  
 64. Id. at 110–11. 
 65. See id. at 104–05 (discussing how socialist-feminists “uncovered the deep-structural 
connections between women’s responsibility for the lion’s share of unpaid caregiving” and 
androcentrism). 
 66. Fraser also argued that politicians appropriated feminists’ critique of patriarchal wel-
fare systems to end federal entitlement to public assistance. Id. at 111. This Article, however, 
does not take up her argument regarding welfare. 
 67. See, e.g., DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF FRACTURE 174 (2011).  
 68. See KATHERINE TURK, EQUALITY ON TRIAL 9 (2016) (“Beyond opening full economic 
citizenship to laboring women, [working-class women] sought to use Title VII to reset the 
terms of economic citizenship from laboring women’s perspective.”); Deborah Dinner, The 
Costs of Reproduction: History and the Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 415 (2011) (analyzing feminists’ pursuit of redistributive claims related to preg-
nancy, childcare, and family leave). 
 69. See DINNER, supra note 8.  
 70. Franklin, supra note 13, at 88. The ideals that animated the antistereotyping principle 
had a longer liberal genealogy. They first found expression in John Stuart Mill’s foundational 
1869 essay, The Subjection of Women. Id. at 93. Mill argued that the enforcement of women’s 
dependence within the family rested on specious biological determinism. Id. at 95. Early twen-
tieth century social thought elaborated on the distinction Mill drew between individual capac-
ity and the social norms that regulated behavior. In the mid-twentieth century, social scientists 
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achievements as counsel to the ACLU (American Civil Liberties Union) Women’s 
Rights Project constitute its central drama.71 The legal and social history, in turn, 
yields a specific normative commitment within contemporary feminist legal 
theory—one that celebrates the potential of the antistereotyping principle.72  
But the prevailing narrative is only a partial history, and its lack of attention to the 
full range of feminist activism has narrowed the scope of feminist legal theory today. 
Part II.A shows that labor feminists understood sex equality to require not only equal 
employment opportunity but also the expansion of labor protections. Yet employers 
deployed Title VII in ways that undermined protective standards and, over the course 
of the 1970s, employment-discrimination law came to serve business’s interests in a 
deregulated labor market. In addition, as Part II.B discusses, scholars and courts re-
sorted to market logic as the normative basis for Title VII. They defined the statute’s 
primary function to be the promotion of efficient labor markets, thereby narrowing 
the capacity for Title VII jurisprudence to make workplace structures more hospita-
ble to employees’ performance of reproductive labor outside of work.  
A. The Erosion of Maternalist State Labor Standards 
The historical and legal literature heralds the end of maternalist labor laws as the 
dawn of a new era of sex equality.73 The scholarship chronicles the challenges that 
                                                                                                                 
 
applied the idea of the stereotype to analyze gender roles. Joanne Meyerowitz, A History of 
“Gender,” 113 AM. HIST. REV. 1346, 1353–54 (2008). They distinguished between biological 
sex difference and the cultural values, social practices, and institutional structures that com-
prised gender. Id. at 1354. Feminists in the late 1960s and early 1970s used these theories to 
contest the idea that an inherent connection existed between the fact of a woman’s sex and 
motherhood. Id. at 135455. 
 71. Ginsburg was influenced by both the broader women’s movement and her experiences 
in Sweden, where state policy encouraged both women’s workforce participation and men’s 
responsibility for familial caregiving. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 97–114. Ginsburg viewed 
the legal regulation of pregnancy as the paradigm case of unconstitutional sex stereotyping. 
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping: From Struck to 
Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095, 1100 (2009); see also id. at 1099–106. Ginsburg’s litigation 
strategy ultimately made significant dents in a constitutional and legal regime that channeled 
women into a dependent, maternal role. Yet the Supreme Court and lower federal courts re-
sisted applying the principle to the legal regulation of pregnancy. Franklin, supra note 13, at 
157–63.  
 72. See Mary Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 144953 
(2000) (arguing that the fulfillment of the antistereotyping principle will take the law in “in-
teresting and radical directions”). 
 73. But see TURK, supra note 68, at 16, 22–25 (arguing that in the late 1960s the EEOC 
crafted industry-specific solutions to the conflict between Title VII and state protective laws 
which accommodated labor feminists’ claims to “equality with protection”). The dominant 
scholarly treatment of the end of maternalist labor laws starkly contrasts with the literature on 
the relationship between labor and the civil rights movement. That literature takes seriously 
the question of whether antidiscrimination law undermined labor organization. See, e.g., PAUL 
FRYMER, BLACK AND BLUE 23, 5–7 (2008) (arguing that the creation of a new, distinct legal 
regime to redress race discrimination “institutionalized the labor-race divide” because even as 
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individual plaintiffs posed to sex-based state labor laws that excluded women from 
higher-paying, industrial jobs.74 This celebratory narrative stems from the literature’s 
focus on the development of an antistereotyping principle: if the legal regulation of 
women on the basis of gender stereotypes constitutes the primary injury, then the 
elimination of such laws represents the fulfillment of feminist activism. Nancy 
MacLean presents the most powerful argument that “Title VII cut the Gordian knot” 
that had divided the women’s rights movement into advocates of the Equal Rights 
Amendment (ERA) and advocates of protective laws.75 MacLean argues that because 
Title VII “promis[ed] substantive fairness,” women no longer had to choose between 
security and equal employment opportunity.76 The legal literature likewise tends to 
dismiss the “protectionist” frame within the movement as anachronistic.77  
This narrative has three shortcomings, all of which limit its capacity to recognize 
and to explain how feminist advocacy and neoliberalism intertwined. First, because 
the narrative represents advocates for maternalist labor laws as marginal figures who 
embraced outdated gender stereotypes, it downplays these feminists’ argument that 
legal protections for workers collectively (and not just individualist anti-
discrimination claims) were necessary for a just labor market. The narrative likewise 
ignores labor feminists’ struggle to universalize protective labor laws. Second, the 
prevailing narrative overlooks the way in which employers used Title VII as a de-
regulatory tool to advance managerial prerogatives. Third, and relatedly, this narra-
tive fails to recognize the limited capacity of employment-discrimination law to ad-
vance the economic security and social welfare of working-class women in a minimal 
welfare state.  
                                                                                                                 
 
courts promoted civil rights, they drained the financial resources of unions defending anti-
discrimination lawsuits); NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, STATE OF THE UNION 19192 (rev. and 
expanded ed. 2013) (arguing that the passage of Title VII reinforced a shift from concern with 
economic inequality, capitalism, and the democratization of the workplace to emphasizing 
legislation and statecraft that remedied the racial, and later the gender, divide within capital-
ism); REUEL SCHILLER, FORGING RIVALS 79 (2015) (examining a tension within postwar lib-
eralism between commitments to economic and racial egalitarianism and contrasting labor 
law’s grounding in principles of majoritarianism and private ordering with employment dis-
crimination law’s grounding in principles of countermajoritarianism). 
Comparing the triumphant narrative about Title VII and sex equality with the more 
skeptical narrative about Title VII, race, and labor reveals two gaps in the literature. The 
juxtaposition highlights the absence of gender in the literature on the ambivalent consequences 
of antidiscrimination law for the labor movement. This literature focuses almost exclusively 
on race. Women make only cameo appearances in these accounts. Conversely the literature on 
feminist advocacy and Title VII largely ignores the labor movement. As a consequence, this 
literature takes insufficient account of the consequences the evisceration of the maternalist 
labor regime posed for unions and for labor regulation. 
 74. See MACLEAN supra note 20, at 11754 (describing the mobilization of working-class 
women to enforce Title VII’s promise of equal employment opportunity for women); ROBERT 
O. SELF, ALL IN THE FAMILY 10333 (2012). 
 75. MACLEAN, supra note 20, at 118. 
 76. Id.  
 77. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 10, at 102425. 
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1. Business Groups’ Defeat of the Voluntary-Overtime Law 
The passage of Title VII reinvigorated a longstanding debate within the women’s 
movement about maternalist labor standards.78 A half century earlier, in the 
Progressive Era, social-feminist advocates and their allies had argued for the im-
portance of labor protection. They used gender ideologies to circumvent the freedom 
of contract doctrines deployed by Lochner-era courts.79 They argued that specific 
laws were needed to protect working mothers from exploitation because of women’s 
particular vulnerability as nonunionized, low-wage workers as well as their social 
role as mothers.80 Advocates for maternalist labor standards hoped, furthermore, that 
laws regulating women’s labor might one day yield universal state labor standards. 
Advocates hoped to win protective laws for women first and then to use these to 
legitimate the idea of labor protections and, subsequently, obtain the extension of 
such laws to men.81 
Through the 1920s and 1930s, maternalist labor laws became a major point of 
contention between social feminists and ERA advocates. Social feminists argued that 
maternalist labor laws regulating the hours and conditions of women’s work were 
especially important given the system of federalism in the United States. The Fair 
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 largely excluded working-class women, over-
whelmingly employed in service-sector jobs understood to be located within intra- 
rather than interstate commerce.82 The National Woman’s Party, the major advocacy 
                                                                                                                 
 
 78. In December 1965, the EEOC issued guidelines stating that Title VII did not preempt 
state labor regulations that had the purpose and effect of “protecting women against exploita-
tion and hazard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1(c) (1966). Some feminists reacted angrily to the agency’s 
sanctioning of laws that blocked women’s equal employment opportunity. Frustration with the 
EEOC’s perceived reluctance to enforce the sex provision of Title VII led to the formation of 
the National Organization for Women (NOW) in June 1966. RUTH ROSEN, THE WORLD SPLIT 
OPEN: HOW THE MODERN WOMEN’S MOVEMENT CHANGED AMERICA 7475 (2000). National 
Councils of Catholic, Negro, and Jewish Women wrote to EEOC Chairman, Franklin 
Roosevelt Jr., and Acting Chairman, Luther Holcomb, defending the guidelines. Letter from 
Dorothy I. Height, Nat’l President, Nat’l Council of Negro Women, Inc., to Luther Holcomb, 
Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (July 28, 1966) (on file with author); 
Letter from Olya Margolin, Wash. Representative, Nat’l Council of Jewish Women, to 
Franklin D. Roosevelt Jr., Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n (July 30, 1965) (on 
file with author) (writing on behalf of multiple organizations including the National Council 
of Catholic Women, the National Council of Jewish Women, and the National Council of 
Negro Women). 
 79. See VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION 63129 (1994). 
 80. Id. at 84–86, 90–106. 
 81. See id. at 63129; see also Joan G. Zimmerman, The Jurisprudence of Equality: The 
Women’s Minimum Wage, the First Equal Rights Amendment, and Adkins v. Children’s 
Hospital, 1905–1923, 78 J. AM. HIST. 188, 199 n.15 (1991) (arguing that social feminists 
sought first to win sex-specific protective labor laws and then to use these as a wedge to expand 
protective standards to men).  
 82. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 2(a), 52 Stat. 1060 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012)); Suzanne B. Mettler, Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Stand-
ards Act of 1938, 26 POLITY 635, 64447 (1994) (discussing constructions of interstate com-
merce at the time of the FLSA’s passage). 
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organization for the ERA, however, came to view sex-specific labor standards as 
inconsistent with the principle of sex equality under law. ERA advocates argued that 
maternalist protections denied women job opportunities and reinforced gender roles 
that relegated women to the domestic sphere.83  
In the late 1960s, the debate over maternalist labor standards produced a “tug of 
war” between Detroit’s “two top women in labor union circles.”84 Caroline Davis, 
Chair of the Women’s Department of the United Auto Workers (UAW), fought to 
repeal Michigan’s sex-specific hours’ law.85 In the postwar period, as women’s in-
comes became increasingly essential to familial economic security, the UAW’s fe-
male membership began to smart under the constraints of the maternalist labor re-
gime.86 Davis was willing to risk some labor protection in exchange for greater 
employment opportunity. Myra Wolfgang, a leader in the Hotel Employees and 
Restaurant Employees Union (HERE),87 strenuously opposed the repeal. Wolfgang 
and other labor feminist activists feared that the erosion of maternalist labor stand-
ards would benefit “highly skilled or favorably situated women” while harming 
“those with the least skill and bargaining power.”88 They warned that eliminating 
maternalist labor standards would wash away a regulatory floor that represented the 
labor movement’s best hope to augment legal oversight of the employment relation-
ship.89 The literature dismisses Wolfgang and others like her as horribly outdated 
—women who embraced a protectionist paradigm rooted in gender stereotypes.90 
Wolfgang, however, argued that labor protections were necessary not because of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. See Zimmerman, supra note 81, at 197–200. 
 84. Ruth Carlton, Women’s Work—How Many Hours?, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 19, 1967, at 
1D (on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s 
Department Papers); see Helen Fogel, Judge Tells Women To Prove that Overtime Is Harmful, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 19, 1969 (same); Colleen O’Brien, Angry Women Charge Secret 
Repeal of Law Protecting Workers, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Oct. 18, 1967 (same). 
 85. Carlton, supra note 84; Fogel, supra note 84.  
 86. On working-class women’s frustration with maternalist labor laws, see Katherine 
Turk, “With Wages So Low How Can a Girl Keep Herself?”: Protective Labor Legislation 
and Working Women’s Expectations, 27 J. POL’Y HIST. 250 (2015).  
 87. COBBLE, supra note 9, at 2. 
 88. KESSLER-HARRIS, supra note 12, at 263 (quoting National Consumers’ League 
letterhead (January 1967) (on file in Folder 657, Box 529, Esther Peterson Collection, 
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe College))); Memorandum from Katherine Pollak Ellickson, 
Chairman, Comm. on Labor Standards, Nat’l Consumers League (Mar. 1, 1967).  
 89.  Letter from Dorothy I. Height, Nat’l President, Nat’l Council of Negro Women, Inc., 
to Luther Holcomb, Acting Chairman, Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n 2 (July 7, 1966), 
(on file with Walter P. Reuther Library, Wayne State University, Detroit UAW Women’s 
Department Papers) (“[T]here is some misunderstanding of the importance of maintaining 
present State labor standards for women until such time as the laws are reexamined and im-
proved to provide good labor standards for all workers . . . .”); Letter From Dorothy I. Height, 
supra note 78 (same). 
 90. But see COBBLE, supra note 9 (recovering the political vision of labor feminists, from 
the New Deal through the 1960s); TURK, supra note 68 (arguing that working-class women 
advocated an interpretation of Title VII that acknowledged the gendered division of labor and 
departed from a narrow, sameness model). 
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biological sex differences but because of the “second shift”91 that working-class 
women performed in the home.92  
The divide between Davis and Wolfgang arose because the UAW and HERE were 
differently situated under law and within the labor market.93 The UAW enjoyed 
coverage under the FLSA and, therefore, following the repeal of Michigan’s hours 
law the UAW’s female membership would receive premium pay for overtime 
work.94 By contrast, many workers in the hotel and restaurant industries—unionized 
and not—lacked coverage under the FLSA because they were understood to work in 
intrastate commerce.95 In addition, UAW women could rely on strong bargaining 
agreements to protect them from involuntary overtime.96 Seventy percent of 
Michigan’s women workers were not unionized, however, and many of these work-
ers labored in the low-income clerical, retail, and service sectors.97 Lastly, the male-
dominated auto industry promised well-paying jobs, which employers restricted to 
men on the basis of state protective laws.98 By contrast, the elimination of state-based 
protective laws did not offer the same opportunity to women workers in highly femi-
nized sectors of the labor market, where few masculinized jobs existed.99 
Within a year of their contest over the elimination of the women’s hours law, 
Davis and Wolfgang—formerly bitter enemies—had joined forces. To the surprise 
of almost all observers, the UAW and HERE forged a united front in a campaign for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 91. On women’s performance of a second shift in the home, see ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & 
ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING FAMILIES AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 
(rev. ed. 2012). 
 92. The hours law, Wolfgang believed, took account of the sociological difference be-
tween men and women’s roles within the family. O’Brien, supra note 84.  
 93. The political science and legal literature characterizes the debate about maternalist 
labor standards as one between advocates of “equal” and “special” treatment for women. E.g., 
MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 5154 (3d ed. 2013). See 
generally LISE VOGEL, MOTHERS ON THE JOB (1993) (characterizing debates within feminism 
about the legal regulation of pregnancy, from the Progressive Era through the 1980s). But this 
is an ahistorical characterization, which treats debate over advocacy strategies as emerging 
wholly from ideological disagreement rather than from material conditions and constraints on 
political action. The debate arose not from advocates’ disparate views on gender roles but 
rather because of the disparate locations of working-class women within their families, the 
labor market, and the law. 
 94. See JOHN BARNARD, AMERICAN VANGUARD 150–52 (2004).  
 95. See Mettler, supra note 82, at 64447. Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act 
in 1966 extended coverage to hotel and restaurant employees employed by businesses doing 
greater than $250,000 per year in business. Susan Kocin, Basic Provisions of the 1966 FLSA 
Amendments, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Mar. 1967, at 1, 3. Yet the amendments retained exemp-
tions for these employees pertaining to overtime pay. Id. 
 96. See, e.g., Jeff R. Crump & Christopher D. Merrett, Scales of Struggle: Economic Re-
structuring in the U.S. Midwest, 88 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 496, 504–05 (1998) 
(describing the UAW’s economic and political power in the period between 1960 and 1970).  
 97. Carlton, supra note 84.  
 98. See BARNARD, supra note 94 at 454–56 (describing the gender and racial composition 
of the UAW and differentials in wages). 
 99. See Carlton, supra note 84 (“With this protective legislation thrown out, nothing is to 
stop the employer from working women 11 hours a day.”); see also O’Brien, supra note 84 
(“I’m concerned about the majority of women who won’t have protection after Nov. 2.”). 
2017] BEYOND “BEST PRACTICES”  1077 
 
legislation that would result in more humane work hours for men as well as 
women.100 They advocated a universal, voluntary-overtime law that would enable all 
nonprofessional workers—male and female—to reject a request for overtime without 
employer retaliation.101 Labor feminists and their unions interpreted the emerging 
principle of sex equality under law as an impetus to extend protective labor standards 
from women to men. Just as maternalism had acted as a wedge to crack Lochnerism, 
now sex equality might serve as a lever to expand protections for labor. Labor femi-
nists sought to implement Title VII’s guarantees to equal treatment under law within 
a regime of robust labor regulation rather than within a neoliberal, deregulated labor 
market.  
The campaign for universal state protective laws posed a new way out of an old 
and painful strategic dilemma: whether to prioritize equal employment opportunity 
or protection for workers. A universal hours law would offer protection to male and 
female workers not then covered by federal or state labor laws. Unlike sex-based 
hours laws, however, employers could not use a universal hours law as a justification 
to exclude women from job opportunities. The fight for the expansion of protective 
labor legislation—not the fight to strike down sex-based protective laws, as the com-
mon wisdom dictates—obviated the choice between protection and opportunity. The 
struggle held out the hope of fusing two strands within American liberalism: a com-
mitment to labor protection forged in the Progressive Era and the New Era and a 
newer, Civil Rights–Era commitment to antidiscrimination. 
Employers, however, fought hard to construct a sex-equality regime that vitiated 
rather than universalized sex-specific labor standards. In Michigan, the Big Three 
automobile companies welcomed some feminists’ challenge to maternalist labor 
standards.102 Protective laws gummed up the wheels of production. Employers had 
long opposed them.103 Their repeal would offer enhanced flexibility and control over 
the production process, including the freedom to make female employees work long 
and erratic hours. After Michigan repealed its sex-based maximum hours law, wo-
men reported having to work as long as seventy or eighty or more hours per week.104  
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By contrast with their support for repeal of maternalist labor standards, employers 
vociferously opposed universal protective laws. They warned that a voluntary-
overtime law would have “dire consequences on production schedules.”105 The ar-
gument that protective laws threatened productivity held increasing sway over poli-
ticians in Michigan and across the nation, as the United States transitioned from a 
period of relative affluence to one of greater scarcity. In 1971, the last of the legisla-
tive proposals for voluntary overtime in Michigan was met with defeat.106 An addi-
tional five states considered but rejected voluntary-overtime legislation over the 
course of the 1970s.107 
The loss of the campaign for voluntary-overtime laws had long-lasting conse-
quences. In Michigan, the Big Three auto companies had defeated legislation that 
would have given nonprofessional workers of different sexes, in the words of union 
activists, “leisure time to be with their families, for living and relaxing, . . . [and time] 
to perform their duties as citizens.”108 The lack of state-imposed hours limits made 
reconciling work with family and civic life a private, and increasingly difficult, indi-
vidual responsibility. 
2. Employers’ Use of Title VII as a Deregulatory Tool 
As the vision for voluntary overtime withered on the vine, employers turned to 
Title VII as a mechanism to deregulate the employment relationship. Historian 
Katherine Turk has shown how employers in the hotel industry used courts’ narrow 
interpretations of sex equality to their own advantage. These employers leveled 
wages between male and female hotel workers while simultaneously deskilling and 
degrading the work of housemaids.109 A similar dynamic was at work in employers’ 
response to the conflict between Title VII and maternalist labor standards. Whereas 
feminists had sought to use sex equality as a legal principle that might augment and 
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universalize protective labor laws, employers wielded sex discrimination as a de-
regulatory tool to invalidate state labor laws that regulated women’s minimum wage, 
work hours, and other conditions of work. Antidiscrimination law became a mecha-
nism to liberate employers from state labor regulations that undermined managerial 
prerogatives. 
The tension between maternalist labor standards and Title VII trapped employers 
between a rock and a hard place. If they complied with state labor laws, employers 
risked violating federal employment discrimination law. Conversely, if they com-
plied with federal law, then they risked prosecution under state law. Employers began 
to embrace the sex equality provision of Title VII, in part as a way out of the legal 
uncertainty they faced. 
Yet employers also deployed Title VII strategically, using antidiscrimination ide-
als to eliminate protective labor statutes and thereby acquire greater managerial free-
dom. In 1973, Homemakers, Inc., a Los Angeles based employer of home health 
aides, filed a lawsuit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.110 Homemakers 
alleged that a California law requiring overtime pay for female employees violated 
Title VII’s antidiscrimination mandate.111 But there was a catch. Homemakers em-
ployed an almost wholly female workforce.112 There was little risk that the company 
would face liability for paying women workers more than their male counterparts. 
And no law prevented Homemakers from complying with both the state and federal 
statutes, by giving the same overtime pay offered to women to any men it hired.113 
The lawsuit was, therefore, a thinly veiled effort to reduce the wages that 
Homemakers was legally required to pay its employees. 
The Homemakers lawsuit exemplified employers’ use of Title VII to invalidate 
sex-based state labor laws across the country. Caterpillar Tractor and Illinois Bell 
Telephone litigated a successful challenge to a state maximum hours law for 
women.114 General Electric Co. litigated in Kentucky to win the right to give women 
workers overtime assignments.115  
Employers’ use of Title VII as a deregulatory tool had an analogue in the civil 
rights context. Sophia Lee shows that conservatives in the 1970s used civil rights 
ideals to build the right-to-work movement.116 They appealed to African Americans 
to support the movement by pointing to racism within unions and the broader labor 
movement. Right-to-work advocates focused particular attention on “union shop” 
rules that imposed mandatory collective-bargaining fees on all employees, regardless 
of whether any individual worker actually belonged to the union. Therefore, these 
advocates argued, “union shop” rules effectively coerced African Americans into 
                                                                                                                 
 
 110. Homemakers, Inc., of L.A. v. Div. of Indus. Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111, 1111–12 
(N.D. Cal. 1973), aff’d, 509 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 111. Id. at 1112. 
 112. See generally EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA 6–8 (2012) (de-
scribing the racial and gender composition of the home-care industry). 
 113. See Homemakers, 356 F. Supp. at 1112 (“Defendants urge that extension of the bene-
fits to male employees may be granted pursuant to ‘Equal Pay’ laws . . . .”). 
 114. NANCY WOLOCH, A CLASS BY HERSELF 214–15 (2015). 
 115. Id. at 215. 
 116. See SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE NEW 
RIGHT 227–29 (2014). 
1080 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1059 
 
funding the same unions that discriminated against them.117 In addition, employers 
used allegations of race discrimination to block the certification of unions by the 
National Labor Relations Board.118 In these ways, right-to-work activists and em-
ployers used concepts of race equality under both statutory and constitutional law to 
undermine labor organization.  
The advocacy strategies of employers comported with broader political shifts. In 
the early 1970s, conservative strategists turned to formal equality as a means to push 
back against the gains of both the civil rights and women’s movements and attracted 
a broader political base to the Republican Party. As explicit racism became less po-
litically palatable, strategists marginalized white supremacists who had joined the 
Republican Party en masse after the passage of the Civil Rights Act. 119 At the same 
time, these Republican strategists strove to redefine civil rights as “equality of op-
portunity” not “equality of results.”120 They fashioned a “color-blind” conception of 
race equality to appeal to white voters. The turn away from explicit racism also cre-
ated the political space necessary to attract some higher-income minorities to the 
Republican Party.121 Political strategists thus joined antiunion activists, business-side 
employment lawyers, and the National Labor Relations Board in reformulating civil 
rights in ways that substituted formal conceptions of race equality for substantive 
ones. Similarly, employers’ efforts to institutionalize sex-discrimination law in ways 
that would invalidate protective labor laws undermined labor feminists’ substantive 
visions for sex equality and, instead, substituted formalist interpretations. 
Employers’ use of litigation under Title VII to promote managerial liberty in struc-
turing the workplace thus formed part of a broader neoliberal appropriation of civil 
rights ideals. 
Employers’ lawsuits challenging sex-based state labor laws under Title VII raised 
the question of what remedy a court should impose when the federal statute 
preempted a state law. Most courts reasoned that invalidation of the state law was 
the only option. The district court in Homemakers recognized that the company’s 
lawsuit was self-serving.122 Yet the court saw no option but to strike down the mini-
mum wage law. Extending the state overtime law to men, the court reasoned, would 
usurp the legislative function.123 The Ninth Circuit affirmed.124 
The courts, however, did not have to interpret Title VII in ways that eroded state 
protective laws. When faced with the conflict between sex-based state labor stand-
ards and Title VII, the courts had another remedial option other than striking down 
the state law. They might have required employers to comply with both federal and 
state law by extending the benefit or restriction that the state law conferred on women 
to men. Extending rather than invalidating sex-based state labor laws would have 
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realized the half-century old aspiration of social feminists and union activists to use 
maternalist labor laws as a wedge to realize universal protections. The pressing di-
lemma was whether the courts rather than state legislatures could properly bring this 
ideal to fruition. 
Support for the extension remedy came from male plaintiffs, some legal scholars, 
and the EEOC. For example, Michael Burns sued his employer, an aerospace firm 
called the Rohr Corporation, arguing that Title VII required the company to extend 
to men the rest periods guaranteed female workers under California law.125 Professor 
Leo Kanowitz, an authority on sex discrimination, argued that the extension remedy 
was the most appropriate.126 The Supreme Court was responsible for the fact that 
state protective labor standards were limited to women, as it had struck down sex-
neutral laws during the Lochner era and had upheld only maternalist regulations. 
Therefore, Kanowitz argued, the courts should compensate for its earlier jurispru-
dence—now discredited—by ordering the extension of maternalist laws to men.127 
In April 1972, the EEOC issued guidelines interpreting Title VII to require employ-
ers to extend sex-based minimum wage and premium pay laws from women to men. 
The guidelines stated that Title VII similarly required employers to extend other sex-
based protective laws regulating work conditions, unless “business necessity” pre-
cluded them from doing so.128 
When the state of California appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Homemakers 
to the Supreme Court, U.S. Solicitor General Robert Bork likewise took a position 
in favor of the extension remedy.129 Bork submitted a brief in favor of the Court’s 
grant of California’s petition for certiorari.130  In the brief, he argued that the exten-
sion remedy would not involve federal courts in an inappropriate usurpation of the 
state’s legislative function. A court would not itself be rewriting state minimum-wage 
laws to include men. Rather, Title VII would be doing the work of extending the 
benefits or restrictions under state law from women to men.131 The Supreme Court, 
however, denied certiorari and missed the chance to rule on whether extension or 
preemption was the appropriate remedy.132 
In the end, Title VII litigation in the federal courts served as a powerful arrow in 
employers’ quiver. As in Homemakers, the Burns court held that extending a sex-
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based state labor standard to men would violate the separation of powers.133 Only 
one federal circuit court reached a different conclusion,134 and even that decision was 
reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court.135 
The decade following the forgotten campaign for universal labor protections wit-
nessed the “opening of the American workplace”—to use historian Nancy 
MacLean’s provocative phrase.136 White, male strongholds in the labor market 
opened to women and minorities. The relationship between management and work-
ers was opened in new and often unbalanced ways, favoring the power of employers 
over workers. In a neoliberal age, freedom came to mean both individual flourishing 
free from discrimination and also an employment relationship free from labor 
regulation.137  
3. Sex-Discrimination Law in a Minimal Welfare State 
Let us return to Fraser’s provocative question about whether feminism advanced 
neoliberalism.138 Fraser’s argument suffers from the “problems of amnesia,” as Joan 
Sangster and Meg Luxton argue.139 Fraser’s account correctly identifies the end 
result—the use of feminism for neoliberal purposes—but gets the causal force 
wrong. As historian Lisa Duggan argues, it was advocates for neoliberal economic 
policies, not feminists, who promoted “the privatization of the costs of social repro-
duction, along with the care of human dependency needs.”140 Katherine Turk shows 
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that interpretations of Title VII protecting the white male-breadwinner standard, ra-
ther than refashioning work to accommodate the needs of caregivers, gained primacy 
only through decades of conflict among working-class women, feminist advocates, 
unions, and employers.141 While the UAW and HERE endeavored to use sex-equality 
ideals as a mechanism to augment state labor standards, employers used anti-
discrimination law to deregulate labor standards and enhance managerial control 
over production.  
The construction of sex equality to mean equal market opportunity rather than 
heightened labor protection deepened the insecurity of men as well as women. In 
California, employers had voluntarily extended maternalist labor standards to male 
workers as a matter of custom.142 Eliminating the maternalist standards, therefore, 
threatened to lower the floor for all employees. As courts struck down sex-specific 
standards, labor feminists advocated legislation that would universalize rather than 
eliminate protective labor laws. Formed in 1971, the Union Women’s Alliance to 
Gain Equality (“Union WAGE”) campaigned for a bill that would extend the juris-
diction of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the state agency regulating the hours 
and conditions of women’s work, to reach male employees as well.143 
Business trade associations such as the California Association of Manufacturers 
convinced Governor Ronald Reagan to veto the bill,144 in part by associating politi-
cally the very idea of labor protection with anachronistic gender stereotypes.145 Labor 
activists managed to get a weaker version of the bill passed a second time—one that 
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gave employers greater control over the state administrative process.146 In 1974, busi-
ness interests captured the regulatory process and Reagan’s conservative appointees 
to the Industrial Welfare Commission vitiated the state’s protective labor stand-
ards.147 Union WAGE and other labor activists protested at public hearings, wearing 
shrouds and carrying placards and banners that read, “10 hour day—no way” and 
“Women need protective laws, men do too.” 148 They would spend the rest of the 
decade locked in cyclical struggles with business groups over state labor standards.  
With hindsight, the warnings of Myra Wolfgang and Union WAGE activists ap-
pear even more prescient. The end of maternalism coincided with an economic trans-
formation that deepened its costs and made less salient its opportunities. Service em-
ployees comprised nearly sixty percent of the American workforce in 1970; that 
proportion reached seventy percent by 1980 and only continued to increase 
thereafter.149 These economic changes placed increasing proportions of workers be-
yond the reach of federal labor law and reliant on state labor law. At the same time, 
the kind of well-remunerated, blue-collar industrial jobs with good benefits that the 
UAW workers held all but disappeared. The nation transitioned to a service economy 
characterized for many workers by low-income, dangerous, and contingent labor.150 
Unionization rates in the private sector declined dramatically. In this context, the 
failure to use Title VII as a mechanism to augment, rather than eviscerate, state labor 
standards appears all the more tragic.  
In the late twentieth-century United States, the advent of sex-discrimination law 
helped to facilitate the neoliberal restructuring of employment.151 The decline of ma-
ternalism removed a legal justification that had long legitimated state protective labor 
laws: support for motherhood. On a political level, the labor movement lost a 
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foothold—labor regulations for women—from which it had hoped to reach height-
ened labor standards for both male and female workers. As a consequence, women 
gained the right to equal employment opportunity in a labor market that lacked pro-
tections for those workers who were not members of strong unions and who remained 
outside federal labor law. The end of maternalism relegated many working-class 
women, as well as men in feminized occupations, to the employment status workers 
had suffered in the Lochner era.152 Classical liberal principles of individual contract-
ing in a private market characterizes the employment status of a growing proportion 
of America’s working class. 
It was not inevitable that the rise of sex-discrimination law would herald a demise 
of state labor regulation. Labor feminists’ campaign for universal protective stand-
ards, including voluntary-overtime laws, suggests a historical alternative: anti-
discrimination law coupled with labor protection. Gender could have been the canary 
in the mine, illuminating the need for universal protection; instead, neoliberal uses 
of Title VII made antistereotyping a rationale for deregulation. It is essential to in-
terrogate the reasons why the antidiscrimination paradigm ascended while that of 
labor protection declined. This Article’s revisionist history of the demise of mater-
nalist labor standards helps to explain the asymmetric achievement of labor femi-
nists’ goals. The convergence between Title VII and neoliberal governance reframed 
the problem of injustice in the labor market. Legal and political culture increasingly 
focused upon the injustice of exclusion along identity lines rather than inequality of 
power between capital and labor. Sex equality came to mean a free market premised 
on individual merit, rather than universal protections that restrained the capacity of 
employers to exploit the most disadvantaged male and female workers.  
B. The Framing of Title VII as Efficiency Promoting 
Even as employers and business trade associations used employment-
discrimination law as a deregulatory tool, legal scholarship and doctrine constructed 
Title VII as a statute that promoted efficient markets. As an antidiscrimination stat-
ute, Title VII could never perform the same functions as labor law in regulating the 
balance of power between employers and employees.153 The statute’s precise mean-
ing, however, was not fixed in 1964 but rather consolidated over time via scholarly 
debates and litigation. The enactment of Title VII represented the fulfillment of mul-
tiple legal and political objectives, foremost among them the moral commitment to 
end racial subordination.154 The idea that Title VII would promote rational labor mar-
kets provided a second justification for the statute. As free-market ideology gained 
                                                                                                                 
 
 152. For further discussion of the relationship between neoliberal and Lochnerian ideolo-
gies, see Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging the Neoliberal 
Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 78996 (2003). 
 153. For a nuanced historical discussion of the contradictions between employment-
practices law and labor law and of ensuing conflicts between the civil rights and labor move-
ments, see generally SCHILLER, supra note 73, 14648, 193219. 
 154. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS 20714 (new preface, 2011) (dis-
cussing the international diplomatic context that shaped the politics of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS 43657 (2004) (examining 
how violent massive resistance to African American civil rights protests in the South catalyzed 
1086 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1059 
 
traction in legal culture, it became an attractive discourse by which liberal scholars 
might frame the normative justification for a highly contested law. Neoliberal ideals 
shaped how scholars and judges came to understand the statute’s meaning. The con-
struction of Title VII as efficiency promoting, however, ultimately cabined doctrinal 
interpretations of the statute that may have catalyzed structural changes in the work-
place that would have protected of workers’ familial and civic lives apart from work. 
1. The Birth of Law and Economics and “Fair Employment” 
The framing of Title VII in terms of the free market dated to the statute’s enact-
ment.155 Some members of Congress argued that the statute would promote a more 
efficient labor market. The House Judiciary Committee Report on President 
Kennedy’s proposed civil rights bill, for example, argued that employment discrimi-
nation frustrated the nation’s ability to meet the rising need “for managers, clerical 
workers, sales workers, craftsmen, foremen, and similar skilled occupational 
groups.”156 The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor contained 
further evidence that race discrimination harmed the economy.157 At its inception, 
some supporters of Title VII imagined that realizing black freedom would also pro-
mote market rationality; equality would maximize wealth. This framing did not 
acknowledge the ambiguities in the statute’s meaning and, specifically, the possibil-
ity that the goals of equality and efficiency may at times conflict. 
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Professor Owen Fiss’s foundational 1971 article, A Theory of Fair Employment 
Laws, examined a latent tension within the statute’s liberal goals.158 Fiss distin-
guished between the “equal treatment” and “equal achievement” principles under-
pinning the prohibition on race-based employment discrimination.159 He grounded 
the normative justification for the “equal treatment” principle—what soon came to 
be understood as disparate-treatment liability—on the basis of market efficiency as 
well as individual fairness.160 The requirement that employers treat job candidates as 
formal equals arose, in part, because race was unrelated to job productivity.161 Fiss 
assumed economic rationality on the part of employers: any given employer had an 
incentive to maximize productivity by selecting employees on the basis of merit and 
not on the basis of an irrelevant characteristic such as race.162 Why then should the 
law need to mandate a color-blind workplace? Fiss concluded that market failures 
justified the prohibition on disparate treatment.163 A few years later, Paul Brest made 
a similar argument to Fiss’s, suggesting that rational discrimination was exceedingly 
rare and, ordinarily, was a pretext for racial animus.164 From the start, the leading 
scholarly interpretations of Title VII suggested that the purpose of disparate-
treatment liability was in part to perfect markets. 
The justification of disparate-treatment liability in terms of market efficiency 
made disparate-impact liability appear less legitimate. Fiss published A Theory of 
Fair Employment when Griggs v. Duke Power Co.165 was pending before the U.S. 
Supreme Court.166 The plaintiffs in Griggs alleged that hiring practices that dis-
proportionately excluded African Americans from employment opportunity, regard-
less of discriminatory intent, violated Title VII.167 Fiss argued that the equal-
achievement principle rested on ambiguous normative grounds in part because it 
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imposed significant costs on employers.168 Disparate-impact liability was efficient 
only when the challenged employment practice did not correlate with worker 
productivity.169 But many employer practices that had a potentially unlawful 
disparate impact on women and minorities under Title VII nevertheless served 
employers’ practices in job productivity.170 Thus, disparate impact raised a red flag 
for any analysis committed to economic maximization. Fiss ultimately concluded 
that the law should recognize the equal-achievement principle, but that it should be 
limited by “a deep commitment to . . . economic efficiency” in the law.171 
Fiss wrote his famous article while teaching at the University of Chicago, where 
the field of law and economics was then blossoming. Henry Simons, an economist 
and professor at the law school from the mid-1930s to mid-1940s, had laid the foun-
dation for the law school’s critical role in the field.172 Simons had attracted to 
Chicago the charismatic economist Aaron Director, whose antitrust courses began to 
convince students of the importance of economic analysis of the law.173 Director 
founded the Journal of Law and Economics in 1958, which he later coedited along 
with Ronald Coase, who joined the Chicago faculty in 1964 four years after publish-
ing his most famous article, The Problem of Social Cost.174 Fiss entered the debate 
about employment-discrimination law just as law-and-economics scholarship began 
to flourish. Efficiency analysis must have appeared a natural starting point for his 
normative analysis. 
Fiss’s article not only drew upon economic thought but also responded to and 
reshaped it. In his 1962 best-selling treatise, Capitalism and Freedom, University of 
Chicago economist Milton Friedman argued against fair-employment laws.175 Like 
Fiss and other subsequent scholars, Friedman believed that capitalism would natu-
rally reduce discrimination.176 Yet Friedman characterized the propensity to discrim-
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inate as merely a taste or preference; in a free society, the best way to dissuade some-
one of his or her poor taste was through persuasion.177 Friedman argued that state 
coercion of nondiscriminatory employment practices unjustly interfered in freedom 
of contract.178 Such interference was not justified by the harm posed to African 
Americans because, in Friedman’s view, employment discrimination constituted a 
“negative” rather than “positive” harm.179 By arguing that principles of fairness 
counterweighed interests in freedom of contract, Fiss challenged Friedman’s funda-
mental premise that market principles should delimit the state’s response to racial 
inequality. In suggesting that market failures justified antidiscrimination laws, how-
ever, Fiss also refashioned economic thought to make it consistent with principles of 
formal equality. His article, therefore, can be understood as a critical moment in the 
evolution of neoliberal ideology during which antidiscrimination law was sewn into 
its fabric.  
Fiss’s broader intellectual commitments make it particularly striking that he 
framed Title VII’s purpose in terms of capitalist rationality. Fiss famously argued 
that constitutional equal protection meant much more than the limit on government’s 
power to classify on the basis of race. Fiss argued that the purpose of equal protection 
was far broader: the Constitution promised an end to state subordination of dis-
advantaged classes.180 In developing a group-based interpretation of equal protection, 
Fiss challenged the primacy of individualism in constitutional theory. Throughout 
his career, furthermore, Fiss evinced a “deep suspicion” of capitalism precisely be-
cause of its individualistic premises.181 He critiqued law and economics for 
relativizing values,182 and by 1989 he proclaimed that the interest in “the efficiency 
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hypothesis” had subsided.183 That Fiss was compelled in 1971 to justify the 
prohibition on differential treatment in terms of market rationality only shows the 
discursive power of the then burgeoning law-and-economics movement. A Theory of 
Fair Employment was thus illustrative not of Fiss’s broader intellectual trajectory but 
rather of a particular historical moment—one in which advocates of fair employment 
came to justify their commitment in what was then perhaps the most powerful 
jurisprudential school of thought within the legal academy.184 The birth of “fair 
employment” was inextricable from that of law-and-economics scholarship, and the 
two would further entangle over ensuing decades. 
As the idea that market rationality both justified and delimited the scope of Title 
VII grew increasingly popular, a corresponding blindness developed to the tension 
that Fiss had identified between efficiency and substantive equality. Historian Daniel 
Rodgers explains that microeconomic theory and law-and-economics scholarship in 
the 1970s yielded a conception of the market as abstracted from social relation-
ships.185 Earlier theories of the market focused on particularized social experiences. 
For example, Adam Smith had opened The Wealth of Nations with a close examina-
tion of the division of labor that organized production in an English pin factory.186 
David Ricardo’s theory of rent came from an analysis of the interaction between 
landowners and tenant farmers.187 In contrast, the new market theory in the 1970s 
exhibited a “detachment from history and institutions and from questions of 
power.”188 Through the 1970s and 1980s, dominant strains of legal scholarship and 
doctrine came to forget Fiss’s insight that abstracted maxims of economic produc-
tivity were insufficient to achieve substantive equality. In place of Fiss’s ambiva-
lence, jurisprudence evinced an increasing skepticism of disparate-impact liability.  
2.  The Consequences of the Efficiency Frame for Disparate-Impact Doctrine 
The disparate-impact doctrine met the most success in the early years after 
Griggs, in cases that challenged racial exclusion from the workplace. Disparate-
impact liability helped to dismantle education and testing requirements in the South, 
which employers had implemented to evade Title VII’s prohibition on formal race 
discrimination.189 As Michael Selmi explains, intent was likely present as a socio-
logical matter, but plaintiffs could not prove disparate treatment.190 Disparate-impact 
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liability, therefore, served an evidentiary function.191 Scholars have noted that this 
narrow interpretation of the theory was more palatable to courts because it did not 
wholly displace intent as the rationale for liability.192  
Yet early disparate-impact claims’ success can also be attributed to the fact that 
disparate-impact liability functioned to eliminate market irrationalities in these cases. 
Job tests and qualifications such as those invalidated in Griggs were wholly unrelated 
to job performance. They thus excluded job applicants who would otherwise have 
worked at equal levels of productivity as those hired, without any additional expendi-
ture by employers.193 Even if employers did not intend to use the tests to discriminate, 
their use represented market-irrational practices. These early race-based disparate-
impact cases, therefore, resembled disparate treatment to the extent that both forms 
of liability dismantled inefficient practices of race discrimination. The early trajec-
tory of the disparate-impact doctrine promoted capitalist rationality. 
From the start, the Supreme Court defined the boundaries of disparate-impact li-
ability with reference to business’s economic interests. As a hypothetical matter, the 
Court might have decided that the nation’s commitment to racial inclusion was so 
great as to prohibit facially neutral practices that had the effect of excluding African 
Americans, regardless of the relationship between the employment practice and 
workplace productivity. This was never the Court’s conclusion, however; the right 
to consideration for employment extends only insofar as one can perform the job at 
a minimum level of productivity. Accordingly, Griggs held that employers bore “the 
burden of showing that any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the 
employment in question.”194 Job tests were valid insofar as they were “demonstrably 
a reasonable measure of job performance.”195 In the next disparate-impact case to 
reach the Court, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Court held that the defendant 
employer failed to meet its burden of showing that two tests purportedly measuring 
nonverbal intelligence and verbal facility were “job related.”196 In dicta, however, 
the Court reasoned that even were an employer to meet that burden, a plaintiff might 
still show that other devices that did not have disparate racial effects would similarly 
“serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy workman-
ship.’”197 Even in expanding plaintiffs’ rights to invalidate practices that had 
discriminatory effects, the Court still tethered the doctrine to workplace productivity.  
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Though cabined by concern for employers’ profit motive, disparate-impact liabil-
ity still imposed costs on employers.198 Validating job tests to avoid liability could 
be expensive. Four years after Griggs, Duke Power Co. had yet to complete more 
than ten validation studies ordered by the Court, citing their expense as a justifica-
tion.199 Economists estimated that the costs of a single validation study could range 
from $20,000 to $100,000.200 A front-page Wall Street Journal article concluded that 
many employers were consequently retreating from job tests altogether because of 
the expense of validation.201 Several commentators elaborated on Fiss’s work, argu-
ing that “Congress did not intend to promote the goal of increased minority employ-
ment at the expense of business efficiency.”202 Some argued that both legislative his-
tory and Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Griggs favored the “equal 
treatment” rather than the “equal achievement” principle and that, as a consequence, 
the “business necessity” defense should be interpreted leniently as requiring proof 
only of a valid business purpose.203 
Debates about sex discrimination in the mid-1970s offer insight into how ideas 
about gender and about efficiency intersected in ways that limited disparate-impact 
liability. As Professor Deborah Widiss argues, a dilemma about how to reconcile 
concepts of equality with physical differences between the sexes inflected debates 
about both disparate-treatment and disparate-impact doctrine.204 In 1972, the EEOC 
promulgated guidelines stating that employer sick-leave and temporary-disability 
policies, inadequate to protect the job security of childbearing women, may have an 
unlawful disparate effect on women.205 In the several years that followed, lower-
court decisions adopted the guidelines’ reasoning in holding that the exclusion of 
pregnancy from otherwise comprehensive, temporary-disability insurance schemes 
violated Title VII.206 In 1976, however, the Court in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert 
held that such a pregnancy exclusion did not constitute sex discrimination.207  
As I have argued elsewhere, both the Supreme Court justices and civil rights and 
feminist activists understood Gilbert as a referendum about disparate-impact liability 
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more broadly.208 The majority opinion held that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that 
General Electric Co.’s policy had disparate effects on women because they had not 
produced evidence showing that the company spent less on female employees’ bene-
fits, as a whole, than on male employees’ benefits.209 The plaintiffs, by contrast, ar-
gued that Griggs dictated the conclusion that a policy that denied only pregnant em-
ployees benefits otherwise generally available had a disparate impact on women.210 
Legal historian Serena Mayeri shows that Justices Powell and Stewart at first agreed, 
but ultimately provided the votes that solidified the six-justice majority.211 Justice 
Blackmun, however, fought to change language in the majority opinion that might 
otherwise have threatened the lawfulness of the disparate-impact doctrine.212 A dis-
sent written by Justice Brennan and joined by Justice Marshall argued that the Court 
should have deferred to the EEOC’s conclusion that the pregnancy exclusion had an 
unlawful disparate effect on women.213  
The next year, plaintiffs had more success using disparate-impact liability to chal-
lenge height and weight requirements for prison-guard jobs. In Dothard v. 
Rawlinson, the majority opinion combatted efforts to weaken disparate-impact lia-
bility.214 While the defendant had argued that a plaintiff needed to proffer evidence 
of past intentional discrimination to make a disparate-impact claim,215 the majority 
held that disparate effects alone would suffice.216 Yet, as Widiss observes, Justice 
Rehnquist’s concurrence devoted attention to how future defendants might defeat a 
discrimination challenge to height and weight requirements for jobs similarly requir-
ing physical strength.217 Once again, the Court affirmed the continued validity of 
disparate-impact liability while also speaking to its limits. The gender cases thus ex-
posed the limits of the doctrine, even in its early years when the doctrine had tremen-
dous success in combatting racially discriminatory job tests. The limits of the doc-
trine revealed concerns about efficiency—physical difference, more than racial 
stereotypes, posed a deeper dilemma for questions of workplace productivity, safety, 
and financial solvency.  
The cases that employers and courts viewed as posing the deepest challenge to 
workplace productivity, however, concerned not physical sex differences but rather 
gendered patterns of caregiving. Beginning in the early 1980s, plaintiffs claimed that 
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(Rehnquist, J., concurring)). Lower courts did not take up Rehnquist’s suggestion, however, 
and instead continued to strike down height and weight requirements. See, e.g., Blake v. City 
of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1375 (1979) (holding that statistical differences in the height 
and strength of males and females could not rebut prima facie evidence of disparate impact 
caused by a police department’s use of height and physical abilities’ tests). 
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employment practices such as very short and conditional sick-leave policies and in-
flexible work hours failed to recognize caregiver responsibilities and, therefore, dis-
proportionately excluded women from employment opportunities.218 Such disparate-
impact claims challenged the organization of the workplace according to the model 
of the ideal worker.  
Legal scholar Catharine Albiston argues that courts were hostile to these suits 
precisely because they challenged “the taken-for-granted, historically determined re-
lationship between work practices and gender norms.”219 During the long industrial 
revolution, from the late eighteenth through the early twentieth centuries, paid work 
came to be understood “in opposition to motherhood.”220 Productive activities asso-
ciated with men’s labor moved outside the home and grew more time-disciplined 
during this period, while women continued to perform task-oriented labor within the 
home.221 Courts likewise refashioned common-law doctrines of master and servant 
to reinforce a gendered division of labor.222 Judicial opinions constructed the norma-
tive worker as a male breadwinner whose sustained and complete dedication to the 
workplace was enabled by the domestic labors of his wife in the home.223 When fe-
male plaintiffs challenged the disparate effects of workplace time organization on 
women, who in the late twentieth century continued to bear disproportionate respon-
sibility for familial caregiving, courts saw these lawsuits as illegitimate threats to 
managerial prerogatives.224 Whether transforming such workplace time norms would 
in reality impose overwhelming costs on employers or, instead, enable a more inclu-
sive and productive workplace, remained unanswered. Employers and courts alike 
understood gender-based disparate-impact claims as incompatible with workplace 
efficiency and as stretching the redistributive capacity of Title VII beyond congres-
sional intent. 
In this context, the 1981 case of Abraham v. Graphic Arts International Union 
was quite remarkable.225 Laurie Abraham worked as an administrative assistant for 
the defendant union, and about a month before her anticipated due date she began 
what she believed was an approved maternity leave.226 Several weeks later, her em-
ployer informed her of its decision to terminate her pursuant to a policy that allowed 
only ten days of sick leave.227 In an opinion written by Judge Spottswood Robinson, 
a former civil rights attorney and dean of the Howard University School of Law,228 
                                                                                                                 
 
 218. See Reva B. Siegel, Note, Employment Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act of 1978, 94 YALE L.J. 929, 940 & n.54 (1985) (listing cases). 
 219. Albiston, supra note 23, at 1134. 
 220. Id. at 1108. 
 221. Id. at 110712. 
 222. Id. at 1113. 
 223. Id. at 111524. 
 224. See Dinner, supra note 68, at 485–86 (describing how courts characterize pregnancy-
based disparate-impact claims as efforts to circumvent work requirements and to secure pref-
erential treatment). 
 225. 660 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 226. Id. at 813. 
 227. Id. at 813, 81819. 
 228. MAYERI, supra note 210, at 15–16; Eric Pace, Spottswood W. Robinson 3d, Civil 
Rights Lawyer, Dies at 82, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at B11. 
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the court reversed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for summary 
judgment.229 The court reasoned that because the ten-day leave period fell “consid-
erably short of the period generally recognized in human experience as the respite 
needed to bear a child” the policy “portended a drastic effect on women employees 
of childbearing age . . . no male would ever encounter.”230  
Abraham remained an outlier, however. Only one other federal court decision 
recognized that workplace norms regarding leave and work hours may have an un-
lawful sex-based disparate impact.231 Courts rejected disparate-impact claims to 
these employment practices at dual stages of analysis: the inquiry into disparate im-
pact and the inquiry into business necessity. At the initial stage, courts assimilated 
disparate-impact liability into a comparative analysis more appropriate to the evalua-
tion of disparate-treatment claims. Courts reasoned that disparate-impact challenges 
to neutral workplace time norms constituted demands for “preferential treatment” for 
pregnant workers.232 This reasoning, however, ignored that a successful disparate-
impact suit would catalyze a remedy that required a more generous leave policy for 
all employees and not just pregnant workers.  
In addition, courts broadened the business-necessity defense sub silentio in 
pregnancy-discrimination cases. The Seventh Circuit, for example, held that to prove 
that an absenteeism policy which disproportionately burdened pregnant employees 
was unlawful, plaintiffs would have to show more than “that it was not justified by 
compelling considerations of business need.”233 The plaintiffs needed to prove that 
the challenged policy was not necessary to the job at all. The court gave the example 
of a high school education requirement for a dishwasher.234 The court reasoned that 
the purpose of disparate-impact doctrine was to address situations in which busi-
nesses “needlessly . . . excluded black or female workers.”235 The court thus implic-
itly lowered the business-necessity standard to a business-irrational standard. 
Disparate-impact claims challenging workplace hours and leave policies, such as that 
brought by Laurie Abraham, seemed beyond the scope of Title VII because they 
functioned as accommodation mandates. Forcing an employer to implement a more 
generous leave policy would impose additional costs associated with hiring female 
                                                                                                                 
 
 229. Id. at 820.  
 230. Id. at 819. 
 231. EEOC v. Warshawsky & Co., 768 F. Supp. 647, 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding that in 
the absence of a business justification, an employer policy of terminating employees who took 
sick leave in their first year of employment violated Title VII). For further analysis of related 
cases, see Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 41–
49 (2009); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 32–35 (2007).   
 232. See, e.g., Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 86162 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(reasoning that courts have no obligation to remedy burdens biologically unique to women 
and suggesting that plaintiff’s disparate-impact claim represented an illegitimate demand for 
“preferential treatment”); Dormeyer v. Comerica Bank-Ill., 223 F.3d 579, 584 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(rejecting a disparate-impact claim on the basis that Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 does not allow “for subsidizing a class of workers”).    
 233. Dormeyer, 223 F.3d at 583. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. (quoting Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
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workers of childbearing age (presuming those workers utilize the leave at a higher 
than average rate).236 Moreover, these claims limited employer control over work-
place structures long understood to rest at the heart of managerial prerogatives. Of 
course, disparate-treatment liability similarly imposed costs in specific instances. For 
example, when customers held racist preferences, hiring racial minorities was more 
expensive for employers. There existed, however, a salient distinction between the 
“customer preference” cases and the kind of disparate-impact liability claim made in 
Abraham. The former imposed on employers and customers the model of a commer-
cial realm free of irrational bias, while the latter challenged the allocation of respon-
sibility for the costs of reproduction between employers and workers which gender 
ideologies had naturalized. Abraham was remarkable because it challenged the no-
tion that reproduction was the private responsibility of families.  
To conclude, Part II has established that sex-discrimination jurisprudence under 
Title VII both bore the imprint of and reinforced neoliberal trends in legal culture. 
Litigation under the statute contributed to the erosion of maternalist labor standards. 
Opponents of robust labor regulation, moreover, used the antidiscrimination ideal to 
delegitimate the ideal of labor protection. In the particular historical context of the 
late twentieth-century United States, sex-discrimination law was overlaid on an in-
creasingly flexible and contingent labor market. Even as employment discrimination 
came to replace labor protection as the central paradigm for understanding justice 
and injustice in the labor market, market logic shaped scholars and courts’ interpre-
tation of Title VII itself. More capacious interpretations of the statute gave way to 
jurisprudence that affirmed the primacy of individual rights and efficient markets. In 
a neoliberal legal culture, labor feminists’ understanding of sex equality as requiring 
collective rights, the redistribution of power between employers and workers, and 
robust state protections receded into a quickly forgotten past. 
III. TITLE VII AND THE LEGITIMATION OF CLASS INEQUITIES 
This Article’s analysis of the relationship between employment-discrimination 
law and neoliberalism holds more than historical interest. It raises the question of 
whether antidiscrimination law today may legitimate economic inequality, even as it 
promotes social inclusion along identity lines. As critical theorist Martha Albertson 
Fineman explains: “Formal equality leaves undisturbed—and may even serve to val-
idate—existing institutional arrangements that privilege some and disadvantage oth-
ers.”237 Historian Thomas Borstelmann observes that after the formal elimination of 
sex as well as race hierarchies in the late twentieth century legitimated socio-
economic hierarchies, neoliberals “could more readily claim that the inequalities re-
maining were the just and reasonable result of letting the natural laws of supply and 
demand operate and letting people rise and fall on the basis of their abilities and how 
hard they worked.”238 Legal theorists Tucker Culbertson and Jack Jackson argue that 
                                                                                                                 
 
 236. See Jolls, supra note 198, at 660–65 (demonstrating that disparate-impact liability 
under Title VII poses costs for an employer equivalent to an accommodation mandate).  
 237. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Hu-
man Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 3 (2008).  
 238. THOMAS BORSTELMANN, THE 1970S: A NEW GLOBAL HISTORY FROM CIVIL RIGHTS TO 
ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 15 (2012). 
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legal reform under Title VII has “produced greater inclusion into existing workplace 
structures . . . [while] the structures themselves recede and are reworked in to[sic] 
the background presumptions of the political culture.”239 Part III of this Article ex-
tends these insights by examining contemporary employment-discrimination theory 
and doctrine.  
Even best practices to eliminate employment discrimination are insufficient to 
realize a labor market that realizes substantive equality for working-class women. 
Employment-discrimination law operates today as a means to perfect the market ra-
ther than to challenge its logic and operation. Title VII promotes individual rights to 
opportunity rather than collective needs for economic security. In reinforcing the pri-
macy of judicially enforced negative rights, antidiscrimination law obscures the ar-
gument for robust social-insurance regimes and welfare entitlements. The resulting, 
deregulated labor market and minimal welfare state disproportionately harms 
working-class women. Therefore, Title VII may function in a neoliberal context to 
legitimate class inequities, even as it opens the market to facilitate greater inclusion 
of women and minorities and allows for more fluid expressions of identity in the 
workplace. This Article suggests that to address the needs of working-class women, 
feminist legal scholars should expend more resources on labor and social-welfare 
law rather than antidiscrimination law. 
A. Neoliberal Themes in Contemporary Sex Discrimination Scholarship 
Contemporary employment-discrimination scholarship bears the imprint of 
neoliberalism. Feminist theorists identify antistereotyping as the central principle 
animating legal sex-equality theory and doctrine. While the scholarship celebrates 
individual freedom and identity expression, it pays little attention to the class-based 
limitations of such theories. Market efficiency also remains a dominant theme within 
the employment-discrimination literature. Although many scholars reject this value, 
it continues to mark a rhetorical border between antidiscrimination and accommoda-
tion that cabins the scope of Title VII. The efficiency trope, furthermore, helps to 
construct a neoliberal understanding of the market as emptied of thick social identity 
and power relations.  
1. Antistereotyping Theory and Individualism  
Contemporary legal scholarship celebrates the antistereotyping principle as the 
dominant theory of sex equality. Mary Anne Case observes that this principle “has 
governed constitutional sex discrimination cases since the early 1970s.”240 Kimberly 
Yuracko states that the prohibition on sex stereotyping in employment “has been the 
most important development in sex discrimination jurisprudence since the passage 
of Title VII.”241 The realization of an antistereotyping principle advanced several 
                                                                                                                 
 
 239. Culbertson & Jackson, supra note 7, at 150. 
 240. Case, supra note 72, at 1448. Case elaborates: “[O]ur constitutional standard with 
respect to sex is not . . . ‘anti-subordination above all,’ but rather ‘anti-stereotyping’ above 
all.” Id. at 1472. 
 241. Kimberly A. Yuracko, Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibition at Work, 
161 U. PA. L. REV. 757, 758 (2013). 
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feminist objectives: It helped to end a formal system of state-sponsored gender strati-
fication and promoted employer evaluation of women’s individual circumstances 
and qualifications. Women gained access to heavy industrial and professional jobs 
previously considered “men’s work.”242 To a more limited extent, men gained access 
to the benefits afforded employees who are also caregivers in the home, such as fam-
ily leave.243 Most recently, antistereotyping theory has catalyzed protections for gen-
der nonconforming men and women in the workplace and has prompted courts’ 
recognition of discrimination against transsexuals.244 
The sense of inevitability in employment-discrimination theory about the central-
ity of the antistereotyping principle, however, should give us pause. There is a seam-
lessness in the narrative about the principle’s ascendance that makes it appear inex-
orable. The voices that disrupted that narrative, such as those of Myra Wolfgang and 
Union WAGE activists, are eluded. The narrative occludes contemporaneous cri-
tiques from the late 1960s and 1970s warning that a constrained political context was 
limiting the claims of middle-class feminists in ways harmful to working-class 
women.245 Why have we forgotten this history? Feminist legal scholarship is not 
merely attentive to the benefits of antistereotyping; it often celebrates that principle 
exclusively and dismisses the importance of a labor-protective ideal, treating it as 
irredeemably tainted by maternalism. 
Might the teleological account of the antistereotyping principle be so appealing 
precisely because it comports with broader, neoliberal trends in our legal culture? 
Professors Grewal and Purdy observe in passing: “The self-defining, self-exploring, 
identity-shifting constitutional citizen of recent Supreme Court discussions of race, 
gender, and sexuality . . . reflects the consumer-citizen model of neoliberal economic 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Inter-
pretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest 
Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (analyzing the potential for Title VII to challenge 
sex segregation in the workplace and the ways in which the “lack of interest” defense has 
limited that potential). 
 243. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003) (affirming as a 
valid exercise of Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a case concerning a male 
employee’s leave to take care of his wife, the provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act 
that provides for damages against a state for denying leave for family care). 
 244. See Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 157, 170–71, 170 nn. 62–65 (2010) (discussing cases).  
 245. For example, the dominant narrative celebrates the 1970 Women’s Strike for Equality 
organized by NOW leader Betty Friedan and its demands for equal employment opportunity, 
abortion rights, and child care. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitution-
alism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave 
Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1988–96 (2003). Yet Bayard Rustin, the chief strategist for the 1963 
March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, responded to the 1970 Strike with cogent cri-
tique. Rustin argued that feminists should instead have advocated full employment, national 
health insurance, and universal pre-kindergarten. See MAYERI, supra note 210, at 44. We may 
not want to blame feminists for failing to advocate for a more robust form of social citizenship, 
as opposed to a narrower conception of gender equality. Yet taking Rustin’s critique seriously 
would help us to understand the way in which a neoliberal political context limited the scope 
of feminist claims. A richer history, in turn, might inform a broader legal imagination today.  
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doctrine . . . .”246 This insight deserves further examination. The rise of the 
antistereotyping principle may appear both historically predetermined and norma-
tively correct precisely because it affirms individualism, the elimination of market 
irrationalities, and deregulation.  
Since the 1970s, three definitions of unlawful sex stereotyping have emerged in 
legal doctrine and scholarship. The narrowest definition suggests that a stereotype is 
unlawful only when it represents a false generalization.247 This definition suggests 
that the factual predicate underpinning the stereotype must be untrue for the stereo-
type to be unlawful.248 It prohibits only irrational discrimination.249 A broader defi-
nition defines unlawful sex stereotypes to mean “imperfect proxies” and “overbroad 
generalizations.”250 This second definition thus prohibits rational discrimination as 
well and is the definition that the Supreme Court has adopted to interpret sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.251 In its landmark 1989 decision, Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII to proscribe prescriptive in addition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. Grewal & Purdy, supra note 27, at 13; see also Martha T. McCluskey, How Queer 
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 247. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 572–74 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
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Choudhry, Distribution vs. Recognition: The Case of Anti-Discrimination Laws, 9 GEO. 
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does not. Id. For example, an employer might irrationally believe that males are better at the 
mathematical skills necessary for engineering jobs. Rational discrimination occurs when the 
use of proxies has some foundation in fact and, as a result, their use is a cost-saving measure. 
Id. at 156. 
 250. Case, supra note 72, at 146667. Case argues that the Supreme Court strikes down 
sex-based generalizations under the law that the Court deems nonuniversal, even if the gener-
alization is empirically accurate. By contrast, the Court upholds sex-based generalizations 
when a majority finds that the generalization is universal (whether or not others may agree 
with this determination). See id. at 1457–61. The Court’s holding in United States v. Virginia 
was exemplary: the majority held the exclusion of women from the Virginia Military Institute 
unconstitutional even if most women would be ill-suited to the school’s method of instruction. 
518 U.S. at 550 (majority opinion) (“[G]eneralizations about ‘the way women are,’ estimates 
of what is appropriate for most women, no longer justify denying opportunity to women whose 
talent and capacity place them outside the average description.”).  
 251. In its 1978 decision in City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, the Court 
held that an employer violated Title VII when it required that female employees make larger 
contributions to its pension fund than male employees because, on average, women live longer 
than men. 435 U.S. 702, 707–11 (1978).  The Court acknowledged that the sex-differentiated 
contribution scheme was based on a “real” rather than “fictional difference[] between women 
and men.” Id. at 707. The court held, however, that Title VII protected individuals against 
discrimination based on membership in a sex-based, racial, or other protected class. Id. at 708. 
“Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an indi-
vidual to whom the generalization does not apply.” Id. 
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to ascriptive stereotyping.252 A voluminous literature explores the precise holding of 
Price Waterhouse, and it is beyond the scope of this Article to recapitulate these 
debates. Instead, we may rely on the useful typology of interpretations offered by 
Kimberly Yuracko.253 Most courts have rejected an interpretation that Price 
Waterhouse protects all forms of gender performance in the workplace,254 holding 
instead that the case requires either trait neutrality255 or category neutrality.256 De-
spite their differences, all three definitions of unlawful stereotyping—imperfect 
proxy, false generalization, and the prohibition on prescriptive stereotyping—simi-
larly conceptualize the legally cognizable injury. The injury wrought by sex discrim-
ination is that of an artificial limitation on an individual’s capacities, choices, and 
gender-related forms of expression.257  
A survey of the literature suggests that many scholars understand the primary 
function of Title VII to be the promotion of individual freedom. Mary Anne Case is 
one of the most influential thinkers advancing judicial doctrine on the subject of gen-
der stereotyping. Her seminal 1995 article, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and 
Sexual Orientation, took aim at gender discrimination “in favor of or against a par-
ticular gendered trait or set of traits.”258 Case’s subsequent scholarship has continued 
to argue for legal protection of individuals who transgress conventional gender 
                                                                                                                 
 
 252. 490 U.S. 228 255–58 (1989) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion) (concluding that the 
district court did not clearly err in finding that sex stereotyping played a part in decision to 
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discrimination Law, 124 YALE L.J. 396, 396 (2014). For example, an employer who refuses 
categorically to hire women for an executive position because of a belief that women are in-
sufficiently competitive. Prescriptive stereotyping occurs when employers expect that mem-
bers of a group should exhibit specific traits. For example, an employer who demands that a 
female employee look and act feminine. See id. at 398–400. 
 253. See Yuracko, supra note 241, at 76986. 
 254. Some scholars believe Price Waterhouse protects all forms of gender performance in 
the workplace, even those that may be idiosyncratic or in flux. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Cover-
ing, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 78081 (2002). Most courts, however, have rejected this broad inter-
pretation. See Yuracko, supra note 241, at 77071. 
 255. If Title VII requires trait neutrality, then an employer may require an employee to 
exhibit, or not exhibit, a particular trait but must remain indifferent to the class of persons 
doing so. For example, an employer can prohibit employees from wearing dresses but must do 
so with respect to female and male employees alike. 
 256. If Title VII requires category neutrality, then employers may enforce gender stereo-
types by maintaining sex-respecting behavioral codes in the workplace but must allow indi-
viduals to select the sex with which they identify. This interpretation has facilitated the claims 
of transsexual or transgendered persons who argue that an employer wrongly classified their 
gender identity in demanding conformance to normative gender codes. 
 257. These injuries are imposed by state action in the equal-protection context or an em-
ployment decision or practice in the Title VII context. 
 258. Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The 
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 79 n.268 (1995). 
Case observed that while legal protections were building for women, as exemplified by the 
Court’s Price Waterhouse decision, men who exhibited feminine gender presentation still 
lacked protection. See id. at 2–3. 
2017] BEYOND “BEST PRACTICES”  1101 
 
norms, regardless of whether those individuals belong to particular identity groups 
(such as female, male, gay, lesbian, or transgender).259 Case’s project is thus to end 
differential legal treatment on the basis of sex as well as behaviors that are culturally 
coded as relating to gender.260 This is a project aimed at individual freedom, as Case 
herself distinguishes between the antistereotyping principle and a principle that 
would oppose laws and institutions that subordinated women.261  
In keeping with the focus on individual freedom, a number of scholars focus at-
tention on structures that regulate identity prescriptively. Kenji Yoshino’s founda-
tional article on “covering”262 initiated a turn in legal scholarship toward examining 
assimilationist bias in the workplace. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati critique the 
ways in which the identity performances in the workplace that are necessary to pro-
fessional success impose disproportionate costs on “outsiders.”263 Tristin Green en-
riches the literature by examining the specific demands that workplace culture makes 
for assimilation related to stylized displays of competence, informal socializing, and 
physical and aesthetic appearances.264 Zachary Kramer observes that sex discrimina-
tion has become more individualized, targeting particular persons who cannot con-
form to the norms of the workplace.265 So too, Kramer argues, should the legal re-
gime respond by protecting the myriad of individualized expressions of gender 
identity.266  
Antistereotyping theory reinforces neoliberal conceptions of the archetypal legal 
subject, injury, and remedy. The neoliberal subject is the autonomous individual act-
ing without constraints in the marketplace; artificial restraints on such action consti-
tute injury; and the actor’s unfettering is an ideal remedy. By locating individual 
                                                                                                                 
 
 259. Mary Anne Case, Legal Protections for the “Personal Best” of Each Employee: Title 
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 260. See Case, supra note 72, at 1473. 
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 262. Yoshino, supra note 254. 
 263. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259 
(2000). These costs include deeper compromises between performed identity and authentic 
conceptions of self as well as greater efforts expended to conform. See id. at 1288–90. 
 264. Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 623, 644–46 
(2005). Courts entrench the subordinating effects of workplace culture organized around 
white-male norms by portraying culture as a business prerogative and nonconformity as a fail-
ure of responsibility or ability on the part of the nonconformist. Id. at 658–64. 
 265. Zachary A. Kramer, The New Sex Discrimination, 63 DUKE L.J. 891 (2014). 
 266. Id. at 952–53 (proposing an accommodation regime for gender expression). 
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freedom as the core function of antidiscrimination law, antistereotyping similarly 
frames inequality as a problem of constraint on individual agency.  
The antistereotyping theory at the core of sex-discrimination law fails to challenge 
the fundamental terms of workplace organization. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
labor feminists insisted that social justice would require not only individual employ-
ment opportunity but also protective laws that would make workplaces more amena-
ble to flourishing family and civic lives. Today, feminist scholarship’s focus on sex 
discrimination stresses only half of that aspiration. By recasting individual freedom 
as the measure of a just labor market, antistereotyping theory may in fact legitimate 
existing workplace structures. The theory therefore entrenches the power imbalances 
between employers and employees that shape workers’ family lives as well as work 
lives. As I discuss in Part III.B below, the limits of antistereotyping theory are espe-
cially injurious to working-class women.  
2. Market Rationality and the Antidiscrimination/Accommodation Distinction 
The early construction of Title VII as an efficiency-promoting statute continues 
to influence scholarship. Leading casebooks use efficiency as an organizing principle 
to unify disparate employment-law doctrines, and innumerable articles apply a law-
and-economics analysis to the field.267 John Donohue, for example, argues that Title 
VII’s normative force derives from the fact that its prohibition on disparate treatment 
rewards workers for the true value of their labor.268 In this view, imperfect markets 
trigger the coercive function of employment-discrimination law, and Title VII’s pur-
pose is to perfect markets. The efficiency frame is so pervasive that it serves as the 
necessary foil against which scholars must pose alternatives.269  
At the same time, it is commonplace that some of the discrimination prohibited 
by Title VII may actually be efficient from the standpoint of employers. For example, 
racism among customers and coworkers may make racial preferences in hiring an 
efficient practice for employers.270 Nevertheless, Title VII indisputably prohibits 
such practices; there is no business-necessity defense to such facially discriminatory 
treatment.271 Therefore, even the disparate-treatment prong of the statute—its less 
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contested form of liability—may be inefficient in specific instances. In this sense, 
the ideal of Title VII as market perfecting is a tenacious legal fiction. 
The fiction of capitalist rationality persists, ironically, in part because of some 
scholars’ efforts to defend the normative legitimacy of Title VII. As Samuel 
Bagenstos explains, scholars have drawn a strategic distinction between traditional 
civil rights statutes and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) by fram-
ing the former as efficient.272 The key article, Mark Kelman’s Market Discrimination 
and Groups, argues that the prohibition on simple discrimination (disparate treat-
ment) gives individuals the right to impersonal, rational treatment in a capitalist labor 
market.273 By contrast, the accommodation claims recognized by the ADA impose 
costs beyond those posed by Title VII’s demand for an efficient marketplace.274 
Kelman concludes, therefore, that accommodation is politically contestable in a way 
that the prohibition on simple discrimination is not because it involved claims to 
finite social resources.275 Kelman’s account is foundational to an intellectual geneal-
ogy that locates the normative basis for Title VII in market rationality. In solidifying 
the justification for disparate-treatment liability, Kelman’s theory likewise makes 
disparate-impact liability even more suspect.  
Kelman’s account of Title VII reinforces a neoliberal understanding of the market 
as emptied of social concerns beyond efficiency. Kelman’s definition of commercial 
activity excluded thick determinants of social identity and social-power relations 
among employees, customers, and employers alike. Kelman writes: “[T]he plaintiff 
seeking to block simple discrimination . . . . seeks to be treated as embodied net 
receipts (in her role as a customer) or embodied net marginal product (in her role as 
worker.)”276 Kelman explains away the problem of the consumer-preference excep-
tion to the efficiency of disparate-treatment liability with reference to abstracted cap-
italist rationality. He suggests that customers are themselves duty bound to treat ser-
vice workers according to dictates of impersonal capitalism.277 Similarly, Kelman 
dismisses the libertarian objection that Title VII compromised employers’ associa-
tional interests. His reasoning depicted the market as a wholly commercial realm 
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isolated from personal identity and group formation.278 Kelman thus recasts the mar-
ket as unmoored from social roles and justified antidiscrimination law in purely 
capitalist terms. Although Kelman is a critical theorist and not aligned with law-and-
economics scholars either methodologically or empirically, he similarly helps to con-
struct an understanding of the labor market as driven purely by individual, rational 
choice. Kelman’s theory thus helps to articulate and to solidify a neoliberal depiction 
of Title VII’s function to perfect markets. This representation in turn delegitimated 
claims that the terms of the market were themselves unjust.  
It is perhaps the conjunction between the efficiency frame for Title VII and 
neoliberalism that explains why the former is so difficult to dislodge. The framing of 
employment-discrimination law in market terms is not universal and has multiple 
critics. Michael Selmi writes, for example, “Most people would contend that our le-
gal system proscribes discrimination because it is wrong[,] not because it is an in-
efficient business practice.”279 Robert Post likewise critiques the way in which the 
dominant understanding of employment-discrimination law instrumentalizes indi-
viduals.280 By requiring that employers treat job candidates and employees in a man-
ner “blind” to race and sex, the prevailing interpretation of Title VII strips individuals 
of their full social identities and, therefore, cabins the statute’s moral import. 
Professor Bagenstos argues that it is not efficiency but social equality, defined as 
inclusion of groups excluded from market and civic participation, which justifies the 
prohibition on discrimination.281 Nonetheless, capitalist rationality stubbornly per-
sists as a primary justification for Title VII and thus an ideological limit on the stat-
ute’s scope. In legitimating the idea that a fully rational labor market is a just labor 
market, the efficiency paradigm further cabins our legal culture’s understanding of 
law’s regulatory functions. 
B. “Best Practices”: The Shortcomings of Neoliberal Antidiscrimination Law for 
Working-Class Women 
The tropes of antistereotyping and market rationality find fruition in the trend to-
ward managerial “best practices” as a means of Title VII implementation. The best-
practices concept responds to neoliberal workplace structures characterized by 
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flexible work schedules, diffuse authority, and contingent employment relation-
ships.282 It aims to enforce employment-discrimination law in this changed work-
place context via managerial training and self-regulation.283 The focus is on an 
institutional approach to regulating individualized interactions and biases as well as 
on using employment-discrimination law as a means to better identify talent and hire 
and promote meritorious workers. While best practices may promote inclusion along 
identity-based axes, such practices enforce managerial authority rather than re-
distribute power between employers and workers. By failing to challenge the 
fundamental terms of the employment relationship—including hours, wages, leave 
policies, and conditions of work—even best practices to enforce Title VII fall short 
of meeting the most pressing needs of working-class women.  
In an influential 2001 article, Professor Susan Sturm explains that race and sex 
discrimination had evolved from “first generation” to “second generation” employ-
ment discrimination.284 Discrimination no longer conforms to patterns of deliberate 
and intentional exclusion from employment opportunities, job segregation, and con-
scious stereotyping.285 Exclusion now derives from unconscious bias, more subtle 
social interaction within groups, and the cumulative effects of daily ongoing decision 
making.286 In lieu of sex-segregated “want ads” in newspapers or race-segregated 
seniority lines in factories, discrimination arises from complex interactions among 
coworkers who, despite their lack of formal authority, may have the power to mar-
ginalize nonconforming individuals in the workplace.287 Given this transformed 
workplace, it becomes harder for courts to trace discrimination to single, adverse 
employment decisions made by individual actors.288 Instead, Sturm argues “second-
generation” discrimination stems from organizational culture.289  
Although they do not describe it in these terms, Sturm and others focus on 
“second-generation discrimination” to describe what social theorists recognize as 
neoliberal trends in workplace organization.290 This workplace is one characterized 
by a shift toward informal norms, flattened organizational hierarchies, and flexible 
job duties and hours. Power is diffuse rather than authoritarian. The boundaries 
between work and personal time collapse as work hours grow longer and more 
erratic. The boundaries between work and civic life erode as identity expression 
becomes increasingly valued in the workplace and one’s career emerges as a site of 
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identity. As Tristin Green shows, today’s workplaces use “strong cultures” as a form 
of social control.291  
In response to the changing character of discrimination within a transformed 
workplace, Sturm advocated a “structural-regulatory” approach.292 Sturm argued that 
courts appropriately performed the function of elaborating upon legal norms.293 But 
they were ill-suited to enforce Title VII because any rule broad enough to cover the 
variety of forms of second-generation discrimination would be too ambiguous to 
guide lawful conduct.294 Sturm suggested that the courts are instead assuming a new 
role, in which they serve as the institutions which articulate legal norms and ulti-
mately serve as the “backstop” for their enforcement but shy away from the elabora-
tion of detailed rules.295 Instead of implementing clearly defined rules, Sturm argued 
that vanguard employers “have instituted internal systems for preventing and reme-
dying problems stemming from complex workplace relationships.”296 These internal 
regulatory systems would ideally focus on transforming workplace structures by ex-
posing problems, producing information that would catalyze action, establishing in-
centives to change behavior, and evaluating results.297 Intermediaries including law-
yers, human-resource professionals, organizational consultants, and employee 
groups would also help to hold employers accountable to public norms articulated 
by courts.298 
The EEOC takes a similar internal regulatory approach in outlining “best prac-
tices” to prevent discrimination. Such practices involve top executives’ embrace of 
equal employment opportunity values, training of human-resource managers, the fos-
tering of an inclusive culture, early dispute resolution, and objective criteria for hir-
ing and promotion.299 Best practices are undoubtedly an important mechanism for 
addressing workplace structures that reproduce gendered and racialized exclusion 
and for promoting individual employment opportunity. At the same time, this trend 
represents a neoliberal response to a neoliberal workplace. The best-practices model 
locates the solution to inequality in employer prerogatives. The concept thereby re-
inforces managerial control rather than empowering workers’ collective organization 
within the workplace. 
Best practices cannot address the inequities that arise from the structure of work 
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itself rather than gender- and race-based exclusion within those structures. The most 
pressing employment-related dilemmas confronting many low-income women do 
not relate to sex discrimination. They concern low wages and poor work conditions. 
Working-class women face both erratic hours, which make it difficult to schedule 
childcare and other nonwork responsibilities, and mandatory overtime, which makes 
it hard to find time for family and leisure. They are channeled into part-time positions 
without adequate health care, disability, and family-leave benefits. They are dispro-
portionately represented in service and healthcare sectors characterized by pay below 
the living wage.300 Such inequities have everything to do with the gender and race of 
the persons who perform certain types of work but are not legally cognizable as dis-
crimination.301 The metaphor that best characterizes the dilemmas that face low-
income women is not the “glass ceiling” but the “concrete floor.”302 
1. Work Hours and Wages: The Limits of Internal Regulation, Antistereotyping 
Theory, and FReD 
The defeat of labor feminists’ campaigns for universal protective labor standards 
casts a long shadow. Though popular discussion often focuses on women’s wage 
gap, work hours and schedules are also pressing problems that receive less political 
attention. Today, working-class women (and many men, too) endure work schedules 
that make it difficult to earn sufficient income and to balance employment with fam-
ily life.303 The FLSA is inadequate to protect the needs of workers in feminized oc-
cupations within the service, retail, and information sectors for stable, predictable, 
and adequate work hours. Had labor feminists won voluntary-overtime laws over 
forty years ago, such legislation may have laid the political foundation for the kind 
of state regulation over work hours that is so desperately needed today.  
The absence of state protective standards is particularly devastating to low-
income workers because of the weakening of the organized labor movement in the 
late twentieth century. Unions provide a primary source of leverage for working-
class employees to negotiate for improved hours, scheduling, and leave policies.304 
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Yet the last several decades have witnessed a precipitous decline in labor’s power. 
At the apex of the labor movement’s power in the 1960s, one-third of employees 
were unionized; today about seven percent of private sector workers and twelve per-
cent of public sector workers are union members.305 The labor movement’s loss of 
influence over electoral politics helps to explain why activists lost momentum to 
augment state and federal labor protections.306 
Working-class women today endure long hours, mandatory overtime, involuntary 
part-time employment, and erratic work schedules. While work hours have decreased 
since the 1970s for many Americans—including those past retirement age, the 
young, and middle-aged men—women have increased their work hours dramatically 
over the last several decades.307 Low-wage, hourly workers, of whom nearly two-
thirds are women,308 bear the brunt of harmful trends in employers’ hours and sched-
uling practices. Up to thirty percent of low-wage workers face required overtime, 
and fifty-eight percent of these workers report they would face backlash from their 
employers if they refused such work.309 While male workers typically are concerned 
with access to overtime work, women workers are disproportionately concerned with 
reduction in mandatory overtime work and the ability to choose whether to perform 
overtime shifts.310 At the other end of the spectrum, low-wage women workers also 
face involuntary part-time employment that deepens their economic insecurity.311 
More than one-quarter of these workers experience further reductions in hours and 
layoffs when work is slow.312 
In addition to excessively rigid work hours, low-wage workers confront un-
predictable and instable work schedules. Popular discourse constructing workplace 
“flexibility” as a positive good for higher-level, salaried workers has obscured the 
injuries that a flexible workforce poses for low-wage workers.313 Frontline managers 
face corporate pressure to reconcile consumer demand with labor supply via just-in-
time scheduling.314 As a result, low-wage employees face very short notice regarding 
their work schedules. For these employees, the number of work hours per week and 
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distribution of hours across the week fluctuate constantly.315 Corporate flexibility has 
resulted in a fifty-one percent increase in the standard deviation of hourly-wages 
rates since the 1970s and a twenty-three percent increase in the standard deviation of 
work hours.316 Meanwhile, less than half of employers provide a majority of their 
workers with family-friendly work schedules, and low-wage workers are the least 
likely to benefit from such policies.317 
Antidiscrimination law is impotent to address the harmful work hours and sched-
ules experienced by low-wage workers. These are not injustices that arise from com-
parative discrimination but rather derive from the structure of work itself. They are 
the result of economic shifts in capital, managerial strategies, and power imbalances 
between employers and employees. The implementation of best practices to combat 
employment discrimination does little to rectify such imbalances and may further 
increase managerial power over workers.  
As Valerie Vojdik argues, the antistereotyping theory limits claims under Title 
VII to those of miscategorization.318 An employer would violate Title VII if he de-
nied a job to a woman with young children on the assumption that her domestic re-
sponsibilities would preclude her from performing routine overtime work.319 The 
employee would likely win a lawsuit arguing that the employer discriminated against 
her on the basis of invalid sex-role stereotypes. But antidiscrimination offers no rem-
edy to the worker—male or female—whose caregiving responsibilities do interfere 
with his or her capacity to perform routine overtime work.  
For the same reason, one doctrine at the vanguard of antistereotyping theory—
that of “family responsibilities employment discrimination” (FReD)—is inherently 
limited. The doctrinal innovation of FReD is that a plaintiff does not need to prove 
comparator evidence to establish evidence of discrimination.320 Evidence of sex 
stereotyping, alone, can suffice to show that an employer made an adverse employ-
ment decision on the basis of sex. FReD has opened the door to hundreds of litigants 
challenging the “maternal wall.”321 But it leaves intact the requirements of a job—be 
that erratic hours, overtime work, lack of family leave, or the dearth of routine ac-
commodations for caregiving. Successful FReD cases prove that the employer 
wrongly presumed that an employee or job candidate would not be able to perform 
the job because of her family.322 FReD does not catalyze labor-market structures re-
sponsive to employees’ needs for predictable and limited work hours, flexible sched-
ules, family leave, higher wages, and healthcare benefits. 
The emphasis on antidiscrimination within legal culture, moreover, legitimates 
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existing workplace structures. Antidiscrimination doctrine frames the just labor mar-
ket as one that fully includes various social identities, rather than as one that gives 
low-wage employees more control over their work lives. Antistereotyping theory, in 
particular, obscures the need for state protection of workers in its focus on unlawful 
assumptions about an individual’s capacity to comply with institutional productivity 
norms. The concern with ending sex-role stereotyping implies that if we could elim-
inate artificial sex segregation and catalyze individual freedom we would have real-
ized an egalitarian labor market. Antistereotyping theory reinforces workplace norms 
and challenges neither the terms of work nor the gendered division between produc-
tive and reproductive labor.323 
2. Family Leave and Pregnancy Accommodation: The Limits of Disparate 
Treatment and Disparate-Impact Liability  
While antidiscrimination law may never reach structural issues such as work 
hours, robust interpretations of disparate-impact liability did once have the capacity 
to prompt workplace transformations accommodating pregnant and caregiving work-
ers. Title VII jurisprudence today, however, limits the redistributive interpretations 
of the statute. The continued influence of neoliberal thought on antidiscrimination 
doctrine only further highlights the need for substantive, rather than comparative, 
rights to pregnancy accommodation and family leave. 
The narrow interpretation of Title VII is particularly harmful to low-wage female 
workers who disproportionately lack access to family-leave and pregnancy accom-
modations. Approximately forty percent of the American workforce is comprised of 
contingent and precarious laborers, whose nonstandard jobs fail to provide paid sick 
days, vacation, and family leave.324 Family-leave laws have limited benefits for low-
income workers, as demonstrated by extensive scholarship in law and social sci-
ences.325 The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) covers only those employees 
who worked at least 1250 hours in the past year,326 for employers that employed at 
least fifty workers per year.327 As a result, the statute excludes about forty percent of 
American workers; low-wage female workers are disproportionately excluded.328 
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Scholars have long launched the critique that low-income women cannot afford un-
paid leave under the FMLA.329 A recent study of California’s paid family-leave law 
shows that retaliatory behavior by employers prevents low-income workers from tak-
ing even paid leave.330 Meanwhile, courts’ hostility to gender-based disparate-impact 
claims challenging leave policies limits the capacity for Title VII to catalyze employ-
ers’ provision of more robust benefits. 
Even recent feminist victories in Title VII litigation highlight the inadequacy of 
employment discrimination absent labor protections. In the 2015 case of Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the failure to assign a preg-
nant employee to light duty so as to accommodate her partial incapacity to work 
could constitute discrimination in violation of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 
1978.331 A plaintiff could show that her employer’s proffered rationale for the non-
accommodation was a pretext for discrimination. She could do so by producing evi-
dence that the employer’s exclusion of pregnant workers from light-duty assignments 
available to other employees imposed a significant burden on pregnant women.332 
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requiring “same” treatment of pregnant workers “as other persons not so affected but similar 
in their ability or inability to work.” Id. at 447 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)). The 
Supreme Court rejected both the narrow interpretation of the second clause advanced by UPS, 
which would have rendered it superfluous to the statutory scheme, and the broad interpretation 
advanced by Young, which would have required employers to accommodate pregnant women 
any time they provided such accommodations to other workers. 135 S. Ct. at 134953. Instead, 
the Court held that a plaintiff could prove that the failure to accommodate constituted discrim-
inatory intent. Id. at 135354. 
 332. 135 S. Ct. at 1354. The majority held that a plaintiff could prove, using indirect evi-
dence with the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, that the failure to accommo-
date constituted pregnancy discrimination. Id. at 1353–54. The plaintiff could show that the 
employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory rationale for failing to accommodate was a pretext 
for discrimination. Id. at 1354. Plaintiffs could create a genuine issue of material fact on this 
issue by showing that the employer’s policy had a significant burden on pregnant women. Id. 
The plaintiff, moreover, could show this burden via evidence that the employer accommodated 
a larger percentage of non-pregnant employees than pregnant employees requiring light-duty. 
Id. at 135455. For further discussion and critique of the doctrinal standards in Young, see 
William R. Corbett, Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc: McDonnell Douglas to the Rescue?, 
92 WASH U. L. REV. 1683 (2015) (arguing that the Young case revived the outdated McDonnell 
Douglas burden-shifting framework that should have been replaced by the mixed-motive 
1112 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 92:1059 
 
Young was heralded as a victory for working women;333 and there is good reason for this.  
Yet the impact of Young for working-class women may be more limited than it 
appears. This is because for the lack of accommodation to constitute intentional dis-
crimination, the employer must offer light-duty accommodations to some other 
group of nonpregnant workers. The only reason the Supreme Court could suggest the 
possibility of discriminatory intent in Young is because unionized UPS workers had 
bargained, in the first instance, for accommodation of workers injured on the job.334 
Most private-sector workers do not have this kind of bargaining strength. Employers 
of low-income, nonunionized women are disproportionately likely not to offer light-
duty accommodations.335 Without a baseline of accommodations realized via collec-
tive bargaining or statutory regulation, the disparate-treatment prong of Title VII will 
not offer a remedy to pregnant workers who require accommodations to perform their 
job duties.336  
The Young litigation can thus be added to a growing line of cases that illustrate 
judicial skepticism of disparate-impact liability. The tension between disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact—often described as a contest between individual fairness 
or equality of achievement under law—is also a debate about the extent to which 
market values should permeate employment-discrimination law. The persistent re-
sistance to disparate-impact liability represents opposition to redistribution not only 
from whites to racial minorities, or men to women, but also from employers to work-
ers. Scholars have recently argued that disparate-impact liability imposes unfair costs 
on employers because it invalidates employment practices—such as testing—corre-
lated with worker productivity.337 In this light, the late Supreme Court Justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
standard set forth in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S 90 (2003)). 
 333. See, e.g., Paul Gordon, Peggy Young Will Get Her Day in Court, PEOPLE FOR THE 
AM. WAY (Mar. 26, 2015), http://blog.pfaw.org/content/peggy-young-will-get-her-day-court 
[https://perma.cc/3YSA-S227]; Tom Spiggle, Why Young v. UPS Is a Big Win for Pregnant 
Workers, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 27. 2015, 1:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/tom 
-spiggle/why-young-v-ups-is-a-big_b_6956498.html [https://perma.cc/5ZK7-NUL2]. 
 334. Memorandum Opinion at 5, Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., No. DKC 08-2586 
(D. Md. Feb. 14, 2011), 2011 WL 665321, at *2. 
 335. On low-wage workers’ lack of pregnancy-related benefits, see O’Leary, supra note 
231, at 35; Brigid Schulte, New Statistics: Pregnancy Discrimination Claims Hit Low-Wage 
Workers Hardest, WASH. POST: SHE THE PEOPLE (Aug. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2014/08/05/new-statistics-pregnancy-discrimination-claims-hit 
-low-wage-workers-hardest/ [https://perma.cc/HG3U-A4MA]. 
 336. Scholarly criticism of Young has missed this point about the relevance of unions to 
the factual basis for the case and has instead focused on the doctrinal consequences of the case 
and its implications for antistereotyping ideals. See generally Bradley A. Areheart, Accommo-
dating Pregnancy, 67 ALA. L. REV. 1125 (2016) (arguing that pregnancy specific accommo-
dations have expressive harms that may reinforce stigma and discrimination); Corbett, supra 
note 332 (critiquing the resurrection of the McDonnell Douglas framework in Young); L. 
Camille Hébert, Disparate Impact and Pregnancy: Title VII’s Other Accommodation 
Requirement, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER & SOC. POL’Y & L. 107 (2015) (arguing that a disparate-
impact theory of pregnancy-related accommodation would do more than a disparate-treatment 
theory to help women reconcile work and family). 
 337. See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1191–92 
(1999) (discussing employment tests which may also have a risk of disparate-impact liability).  
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Antonin Scalia’s famous suggestion that disparate-impact liability may be un-
constitutional because it requires employers to engage in disparate treatment takes 
on a new cast.338 Most have understood Scalia’s comment as an expression of 
hostility to antidiscrimination law that requires violation of a commitment to race- 
and sex-blind treatment.339 But it also manifests a neoliberal impulse to limit the 
extent that Title VII imposes any legal mandates inconsistent with market logic. 
C. Toward a Feminist Theory of Class  
Popular commentators and some legal scholars have begun to emphasize the im-
portance of taking account of class in crafting strategies to remediate work-family 
conflict.340 This Article has gone further to argue that the ascent of antidiscrimination 
doctrine as a central paradigm for justice in the labor market has facilitated the 
neoliberal restructuring of the labor market. Yet scholars’ failure to recognize the 
historical intersections between antidiscrimination law and neoliberalism has created 
blind spots in contemporary visions of sex equality. Despite attention to intersection-
ality, feminist legal theory has paid insufficient attention to class.341 This Article uses 
history to center the dilemmas that class poses for feminist legal theory. 
What would it mean to understand sex equality and the potential and limitations 
of sex-discrimination law from the perspective of working-class women?342 It would 
require scholars to expand their historical narrative to include labor feminists such 
as Myra Wolfgang, Caroline Davis, and Union WAGE members.343 It would require 
                                                                                                                 
 
 338. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594–96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (suggesting 
that disparate-impact liability and equal protection are at “war”). 
 339. See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 
1363 (2010) (describing a “general reading” of the Ricci decision that would lead to the con-
stitutional invalidity of disparate-impact liability because the latter would violate the principle 
of colorblindness understood in this reading “as the guiding value of equal protection”).  
 340. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE 15186 (2010) 
(arguing that a culture gap along class lines obscures solutions to work-family conflict); Judith 
Shulevitz, How To Fix Feminism, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/06/12/opinion/sunday/how-to-fix-feminism.html (arguing for “caregiverism” involving 
greater state support for caregivers) [https://perma.cc/E6YW-DADD]. 
 341. But see Michele E. Gilman, En-Gendering Economic Inequality, 32 COLUM. J. 
GENDER & L. 1 (2016) (arguing that recent Court decisions have deepened the class-based 
subordination of women); Martha T. McCluskey. Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challeng-
ing the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 785 (2003) (arguing that 
identity-based conceptions of social equity “favors the interests of the most privileged mem-
bers of society”); O’Leary, supra note 231 (assessing the class-based limitations of the federal 
FMLA and analogous state laws). 
 342. I do not recommend, here, that we should apply differential legal regimes 
—antistereotyping and labor protection—to different classes. Rather, I am suggesting that if 
forced by the constraints of the legal and political landscape to choose between sex 
discrimination and labor protection, feminists should take responsibility for the class-based 
consequences of strategic decision making. Such responsibility would not negate the important 
project of highlighting the way in which antifeminist opposition has narrowed the possibilities 
for legal and political action. 
 343. I am suggesting that we might recover lost strands of legal and political history to 
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recasting the end of maternalist labor laws in a more nuanced light—one that would 
reveal the tragic defeat of universal overtime laws and other protective state labor 
standards as well as victories against sex-role stereotyping. It would require scholars 
to interrogate legal and political discourses that conflate the advantages of Title VII 
for professional and skilled women with its benefits for all women. It would require 
confronting the limitations of antidiscrimination law to achieve the kinds of social 
and economic protections that working-class women, in particular, need and lack.344  
By historicizing the development of sex-discrimination law in a neoliberal con-
text, I do not intend to advocate a return to gender stereotypes. My argument thus 
departs from that of scholars, such as Julie Suk, who have questioned whether gender 
stereotypes are indeed bad for women.345 To recognize the limits of antistereotyping 
theory does not necessarily involve a claim for a legal regime based on gender stereo-
types. Rather, it invites us to recall that employers have used antistereotyping theory 
to advance a deregulatory agenda and to oppose the realization of labor protections. 
It invites us to recover a feminist vision that fused civil rights era commitments to 
antistereotyping with Progressive Era and New Deal commitments to labor 
protection.  
Skeptics might argue that the critique of Title VII in this Article is inapposite to a 
theory of sex equality as opposed to class equity. Certainly, Title VII was limited by 
design in its capacity to advance economic justice along class lines. The purpose of 
the statute was not to regulate the balance of power between labor and capital. Yet 
this Article recovers labor feminists’ view that equality for working-class women 
required both equal opportunity and labor regulation. Without a redistribution of 
power between employers and employees, working-class women and men will not 
be able to realize the kind of workplace supports they need for lives outside of work. 
                                                                                                                 
 
mobilize them against teleological conceptions of sex equality. For an analysis of feminist 
temporal politics, see Victoria Browne, Backlash, Repetition, Untimeliness: The Temporal 
Dynamics of Feminist Politics, 28 HYPATIA 905 (2013), which argues that feminists can find 
in repeated conflicts within women’s history lost legacies that can inspire contemporary 
resistance. 
 344. In suggesting the limitations of Title VII for working-class women, I do not intend to 
argue that only these women require labor and social protections. Rather, all women and men 
require workplace accommodations, stable and predictable hours, shorter workweeks, and 
paid leave to participate effectively in care within their families and communities. But 
working-class women are positioned in the labor market such that they disproportionately lack 
such supports. The United States provides the kinds of protections listed above via the work-
place, as a matter of employer discretion, rather than via the state, as a matter of entitlement. 
The inability for antidiscrimination law to realize labor protections has particularly harmful 
consequences for low-wage workers because of the terms of their employment. 
 345. Suk argues that maternalistic legal regimes in Western Europe do a better job helping 
women to reconcile careers with family life than does the antidiscrimination regime in the 
United States. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Bad for Women? Rethinking Antidiscrim-
ination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 49–51, 60–63 (2010). Suk 
suggests a counterfactual: were Congress to untie maternity leave from sick-leave entitlements 
then employers and business groups might tolerate more expansive entitlements for women 
such as paid maternity and family leave. Id. at 21–24. Reasoning from this historical and com-
parative context, Suk argues for a relaxation on prohibition of stereotyping to allow legislation 
targeting women’s “special” relationship with their children. Id. at 6063, 6869. 
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The notion that economic justice for workers is distinct from issues of sex equality 
is itself an historical artifact—a product of the way in which legal meaning was con-
structed over time.  
This Article, therefore, contributes to scholarship that seeks to dismantle the di-
vides between labor and employment-discrimination law.346 These exist as largely 
distinct academic fields, with independent bodies of scholarship. The doctrines asso-
ciated with each field are also taught in distinct courses, with employment discrimi-
nation occupying more pride of place in most law-school curriculums than labor law. 
The institutional and scholarly divides between labor and employment-
discrimination law, however, contribute to a lack of scholarly engagement with class 
as a central dimension of gender justice. The construction of sex equality as a prob-
lem of discrimination—in ways that privilege antistereotyping, efficiency, and judi-
cially enforced negative rights—legitimates class-based inequities experienced by 
women and men in feminized occupations. A more capacious understanding of sex 
equality—rooted in collective security, workers’ organizing rights, and positive wel-
fare entitlements—necessitates fundamental changes in the labor market, economy, 
and social policy. To help illuminate the path to this change, legal scholars need to 
produce scholarship and teach courses that integrate antidiscrimination law with la-
bor and social-welfare law.  
CONCLUSION: LOOKING BACKWARD TO MOVE FORWARD 
This Article argues that in the late twentieth century employment-discrimination 
law intertwined with neoliberalism on ideological, institutional, and doctrinal levels. 
Title VII shares with neoliberalism fundamental ideals including individual freedom, 
negative rights, and efficiency. That convergence did not determine whether 
neoliberalism would serve neoliberal purposes, but it created the historical possibility 
for actors to use Title VII in ways that stripped equality of its redistributive content. 
Employers and state politicians used litigation under Title VII to undermine protec-
tive labor standards. Courts foreclosed plaintiffs’ claims that might have transformed 
employment structures to make them more supportive of social life outside of the 
workplace. Our nation might have realized the vision of labor feminists who advo-
cated workers’ rights to state protection as well as to equal employment opportunity. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 346. Labor-law scholars have initiated this inquiry by exploring the role of employment-
discrimination statutes in worker organizing. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the 
Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 390–94 (2005) (arguing 
that the threat of employment-law damages can pressure firms into recognizing collective self-
governance by workers); Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of Amer-
ican Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 208–212 (2007) (arguing that unions 
“strategic[ally]” deploy employment law to generate negative publicity for firms and positive 
displays of union power that can induce employers, for example, to agree to card-check recog-
nition procedures); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2685, 272234 (2008) (arguing that FLSA and Title VII can galvanize worker organizing by 
framing a common grievance and prompting a collective identity as well as insulate their col-
lective action from employer interference through retaliation provisions). 
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Instead, U.S. legal culture largely forgot a vision of equality premised upon collec-
tive needs, positive rights, and a more equitable distribution of responsibility for so-
cial reproduction between the state, market, and family.  
The Article’s historical argument offers important insight into the limits of anti-
discrimination theory today. Antistereotyping doctrine challenges misconceptions 
about who is able to perform job duties. But it poses no challenge to employment 
structures including work hours, leave policies, and benefits. The theory promotes 
individual freedom of gender expression in the workplace, but does not redress 
power imbalances between employers and employees. In addition, efficiency re-
mains a leading interpretive frame in employment-discrimination law. Its dominance 
contributes to judicial hostility to disparate-impact claims that challenge the defini-
tion of workplace productivity and the terms of the employment relationship. These 
limitations of antidiscrimination jurisprudence disproportionately burden low-
income women. Antidiscrimination law fails to address the problems of low wages, 
long and erratic hours, and dangerous workplaces.  
The Article calls for a redirection of scholarly resources beyond best practices in 
employment-discrimination law toward theories that address the structures of the la-
bor market and the employment relationship. There are struggles yet to be fought on 
the frontiers of antidiscrimination, but it may also be time to realize the incapacity 
for even these aspirational forms of law to realize a just workplace for low-income 
workers. Indeed, the focus on antidiscrimination as the core meaning of equality may 
legitimate class-based inequities. Taking significant steps toward a more just labor 
market for working-class women and men may require shifting the loci of our schol-
arly energies. 
This Article’s insights open up important new lines of inquiry in several fields. 
Understanding the relationship between antidiscrimination and free-market ideals 
enriches the history of American liberalism. Scholars might research further the ide-
ological and institutional connections among individual freedom, state neutrality, 
and efficiency. To take just one discrete example: In 1922, the journalist and political 
commentator Walter Lippmann introduced the concept of the stereotype into 
American popular thought.347 Fifteen years later, Lippmann wrote the first political 
treatise in English to argue for the superiority of the free-market system.348 
Lipmann’s dual interests could not have been coincidental. There is not yet a com-
prehensive history of the concept of the stereotype. Such a study would deepen our 
understanding of why employment-discrimination law was susceptible to neoliberal 
appropriation in the late twentieth century. 
Exposing the imbrication of Title VII and neoliberalism is not only a task for 
historians, however. This Article shows why it is an urgent project for legal theorists. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 347. See WALTER LIPPMANN, PUBLIC OPINION 79–94 (1922) (defining a stereotype as a so-
cial norm that constrains individual decisions and life choices); see also Bernstein, supra note 
14, at 658.   
 348. See WALTER LIPPMANN, AN INQUIRY INTO THE PRINCIPLES OF THE GOOD SOCIETY 
(1937) (arguing that free markets promote social trust and cooperation among individuals); 
see also Dieter Plehwe, Introduction to THE ROAD FROM MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE 
NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 13 (Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., paperback ed. 
with new preface 2015).  
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Title VII presupposes a definition of equality rooted in market participation. Accord-
ingly, the statute may be inherently linked to neoliberalism. Building upon this in-
sight, feminist scholars might further excavate why Title VII cannot realize substan-
tive conceptions of gender equality.349 Employment-discrimination law reinforces a 
division between productive labor in the market and reproductive labor in the 
home.350 It can help to redistribute familial and market functions between the sexes—
enabling women to act as breadwinners and men to act as caregivers—but it does not 
revalue the caregiving role itself. By defining equality in terms of labor-market par-
ticipation, employment-discrimination law may reinforce the legitimacy of 
neoliberal policies that make social reproduction a private responsibility.351 This has 
disproportionate effects on women and men who perform caregiving via unpaid labor 
for their families as well as low-paid labor in the market.352 Feminist scholars need 
to look beyond antidiscrimination theory to meet the needs of low-income workers 
whose work lives conflict with their family lives.353 If we fail to recognize how 
                                                                                                                 
 
 349. Critical race theorists and disability scholars, too, have an essential role to play in 
reaching beyond “best practices.” African Americans and civil rights advocates have in the 
past advocated class-based remedies for the economic subordination experienced by racial 
minorities; this historical example provides a foundation for contemporary theories of racial 
justice not limited to antidiscrimination law. See, e.g., RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE 
OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007) (arguing that a Thirteenth Amendment litigation strategy combatting 
Jim Crow as a system of economic exploitation held greater potential to help poor African 
Americans than the Fourteenth Amendment litigation challenging racial segregation); 
JONATHAN SCOTT HOLLOWAY, CONFRONTING THE VEIL (2002) (examining African American 
thinkers who approached racial problems via a class analysis). In establishing rights to accom-
modation, disability law poses an explicit challenge to efficiency ideals in antidiscrimination 
theory. See Bagenstos, supra note 272. Legal scholars have called for more expansive forms 
of accommodation. See Widiss, supra note 206, at 1025–34 (arguing that employers have a 
duty under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act to extend to pregnant workers the same accom-
modations offered to employees with disabilities cognizable under the ADA). But the schol-
arship can take the insight of disability theory further to call for a severance of the very concept 
of just employment from market logic. 
 350. Employment-discrimination law enables women to occupy the role of breadwinner as 
well as caregiver. But it maintains the fundamental division between market work and un-
remunerated care work. The ongoing division, itself, perpetuates injustice even if men and 
women participated in the labor market to an equal degree.   
 351. For further discussion of how neoliberalism reinforces a public/private divide, see 
DUGGAN, supra note 140, at 1315. 
 352. The low value placed on care contributes to the lack of public support for familial 
caregiving and to the low wages paid market-based caregivers such as home health care and 
childcare workers. See generally MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE (2010) (arguing 
that caretaking should join liberty and equality as standard goods promoted by liberalism and 
that the state should support the family in its caretaking role); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE AUTONOMY MYTH (2004) (arguing for collective, public responsibility for the inevitable 
dependency that arises from human biology and development as well as the derivative depend-
ency of caregivers); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART (2001) (arguing that the non-
payment and underpayment of caregiving means that women absorb the costs of our capitalist 
economy).   
 353. Employment-discrimination law does not itself transform low-wage, feminized jobs 
to make the wages more adequate to support a family, the hours more amenable to family life, 
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employment-discrimination law may reinforce neoliberal cutbacks in labor protec-
tion and welfare entitlements, then we risk exacerbating economic inequalities. 
Last, this Article invites scholars to reconsider the meaning of both antidiscrimi-
nation and neoliberalism. The Article has revealed an underside of employment-
discrimination theory that entrenches class-related privilege and disadvantages. As 
institutionalized in a neoliberal context, there is less to celebrate about Title VII than 
we have thought. Conversely, however, there also may be less to lament about 
neoliberalism. If neoliberalism includes a commitment to the elimination of status 
hierarchies and the unraveling of race and gender stereotypes, can neoliberalism be 
all bad? Recognizing the intersection of ideas about individual freedom in both anti-
discrimination and neoliberal theory calls for a richer, less ideologically inflected 
understanding of neoliberalism. Perhaps, in the end, we are all neoliberals, now.354 
                                                                                                                 
 
or the conditions safer. 
 354. If so, then it would suggest a historical evolution in legal theory from the moment in 
the late twentieth century when scholars realized that they were “all legal realists now.” See, 
e.g., Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (review-
ing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 19271960 (1986)).  
